5 ms·

"And they can only build the aircraft they are certified to, using the same certified components, and the same certified tools." And that level of rigor is app

"And they can only build the aircraft they are certified to, using the same certified components, and the same certified tools." And that level of rigor is appropriate for the stakes that selling mass produced commercial aircraft implies. The discussion context was critical systems. But then you threw "word processors" in there. Why?

mcguire 5y ago
Because word processor documents have often been the vectors for attacks. And once an attack is inside your systems, there is nothing preventing the attack attached to a document from infecting and encrypting your machine or infecting your PLC and destroying your industrial equipment.
- restalis 5y ago
  I'd say that the surface of attack here is the industrial equipment's link to general computing equipment (which it's expected to be less secure). The solution just can't be to secure the whole world of software that may somehow end up on general use computers. The point is, my remark is still valid, as a discussion on critical systems got mixed with clearly non-critical ones.
  - mcguire 5y ago
    Ok, so I shouldn't have confused the issue by mentioning Stuxnet. The point is, failing to secure those general use computers has bad consequences.
    - salawat 5y ago
      I don't think you confused the issue there at all, but forced a clarification of boundaries. The safety critical PLC industrial controller network should be isolated from the Net, however, even with the pipeline hack, the shutdown of the PLC network was due to compromise of billing systems, which are non-safety critical to the immediate user population (administration) but mission critical to the architecture of the western, market-mediated economic activity. You can't secure those systems perfectly, though we can definitely do better. The correct response, however, in this case is effective deterrence of those looking to engage in cyber offensives. Like it or not, when you can sit back outside the reach of effective enforcement measures, and cause mayhem and havoc, and make a buck doing it financial incentivization mechanisms pretty much ensure it will happen. I just hope we don't take it too far. Many young and talented people in the CS and IT space cut their teeth testing the limits of legitimate access without pushing into the full on destructive regime these attackers have. I'd hate to see things cracked down on so hard we lose a good signal for talent because we decide that the integrity of cyber systems must be defended at all costs. However, there needs to be a much more pronounced reaction to the types ofor blatantly malicious activity that has been escalating for the past decade or so.

mcguire 5y ago

Because word processor documents have often been the vectors for attacks. And once an attack is inside your systems, there is nothing preventing the attack attached to a document from infecting and encrypting your machine or infecting your PLC and destroying your industrial equipment.

restalis 5y ago
I'd say that the surface of attack here is the industrial equipment's link to general computing equipment (which it's expected to be less secure). The solution just can't be to secure the whole world of software that may somehow end up on general use computers. The point is, my remark is still valid, as a discussion on critical systems got mixed with clearly non-critical ones.
- mcguire 5y ago
  Ok, so I shouldn't have confused the issue by mentioning Stuxnet. The point is, failing to secure those general use computers has bad consequences.
  - salawat 5y ago
    I don't think you confused the issue there at all, but forced a clarification of boundaries. The safety critical PLC industrial controller network should be isolated from the Net, however, even with the pipeline hack, the shutdown of the PLC network was due to compromise of billing systems, which are non-safety critical to the immediate user population (administration) but mission critical to the architecture of the western, market-mediated economic activity. You can't secure those systems perfectly, though we can definitely do better. The correct response, however, in this case is effective deterrence of those looking to engage in cyber offensives. Like it or not, when you can sit back outside the reach of effective enforcement measures, and cause mayhem and havoc, and make a buck doing it financial incentivization mechanisms pretty much ensure it will happen. I just hope we don't take it too far. Many young and talented people in the CS and IT space cut their teeth testing the limits of legitimate access without pushing into the full on destructive regime these attackers have. I'd hate to see things cracked down on so hard we lose a good signal for talent because we decide that the integrity of cyber systems must be defended at all costs. However, there needs to be a much more pronounced reaction to the types ofor blatantly malicious activity that has been escalating for the past decade or so.