4 ms·
>To capture an image of the computer’s RAM, run EFDD on the computer on which the VeraCrypt disk is currently mounted. This seems like a pointless exercise. If
by gruez 5y ago
>To capture an image of the computer’s RAM, run EFDD on the computer on which the VeraCrypt disk is currently mounted.
This seems like a pointless exercise. If the disk is already decrypted and mounted, plus you have access to the computer, why not just... directly read the disk? Or initiate the decryption routine?
- nitrogen 5y agoSpeculating: if you have the key, you can make a read-only copy of the disk and analyze it on your own time without risk of altering it.
- gruez 5y agoIf you want a read-only copy, can't you plug in an external hard drive and then run dd on the raw block device?
- hdbdhr66 5y agoPeople buy VPS from linode/digitalocean/vultr or worse some solusvm based provider and believe such crytps give them a secure area
- nacs 5y agoAs long as the VPS owner don't leave the Veracrypt image mounted and give a stranger root access to the server, this wouldn't work. Also, if a hacker has admin/root access as is required for this tool to work, you have all kinds of other problems.
- hdbdhr66 5y agoYou can scan the memory of a guest from the hypervisor afaik
- _kbh_ 5y agoOn most hosts you can but I believe AMDs EPYC processor support hypervisors where the host cannot access the memory via a feature called Secure Encrypted Virtualisation (SEV).
- SXX 5y agoYeah there is SEV support, but I tried to find whatever e.g Oracle Cloud utilize it and found nothing. It's also require SEV support in both hypervisor and guest OS. PS: you can check whatever SEV enabled this way in the guest. It's suppose to say "AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) active": dmesg | grep -i sev
- aborsy 5y agoVPS provider has the keys through RAM. I would be interested to know if VPS providers actually go as far as dumping and snapshoting RAM (most of them claim they don’t even access disk or monitor traffic). It would be big deal for systems such as EC2.
- nacs 5y agoAgreed, the encrypted image has to be mounted and you have to admin/root access to capture the RAM contents. This isn't what I would call "Breaking" Veracrypt.
- jcrawfordor 5y agoThe advantage isn't huge but it does exist. Stealing encryption keys out of memory is a reasonably common thing for more sophisticated malware to do, because if you can opportunistically do it once it generally confers permanent access to the encrypted data whenever you want. Copying the contents out isn't very desirable because 1) it is slow and bandwidth intensive which means it is less likely to succeed opportunistically and more detectable, 2) you will not be able to examine the data again in the future (including changes) without finding an opportunity to copy it out again. It is also often just easier for someone with malicious intent to subtly capture the encrypted volume (can be sent out very slowly without worrying about user behavior) and then examine it remotely (easier and safer to use/iterate on custom tools when you're not shipping them to the compromised machine). This way malware, especially like a plugin-based botnet, can continuously check for the key and grab it whenever it's in memory. Then later on, as convenient, plugins can search the encrypted volume for specific signatures whenever they want. That includes loading more signatures in the future, rescanning for changes, etc. All in all, the ability to extract the key from memory violates the fundamental assumption of the user that the data is not accessible when they have not mounted the volume... it means that if the volume has ever been mounted, unauthorized software might have captured the information necessary to examine it as desired, in a subtle way. Elcomsoft is also principally a forensic vendor, and this kind of thing is very useful in forensics scenarios when you encounter a live machine (e.g. law enforcement seizure). If you can capture the key from the live machine quickly, you can do your analysis later at leisure and with less risk of contamination of the evidence. This minimizes the need for complex and risky methods like transporting the machine without power interruption. Obviously this kind of problem is not necessarily completely solvable... if the data was decrypted then there was, at some point, the material to decrypt it present on the system. But more modern disk and file encryption solutions tend to use various solutions like the TPM and operating system features to avoid the key being available in memory. Finally, as always, password reuse is an issue here. If you can get the key material there's a good bet it might work on other volumes as well if you can recompute for whatever the volume salt is... this may be more or less practical depending on how TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt derives the key which I don't remember well.