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I would like to see a focus on making linux desktops secure. Just because we are usually running non-evil code, it doesn’t mean that it doesn’t process evil dat
by kaba0 5y ago
I would like to see a focus on making linux desktops secure. Just because we are usually running non-evil code, it doesn’t mean that it doesn’t process evil data that can easily exploit the numerous bugs (especially with the everything in C mentality) found in open-source software. And frankly, flatpak is not a good direction (especially written in C), it is no solution to the dependency hell problem, nor to proper sandboxing.
A new userspace should be built similar to Android with proper capability-based sandboxes.
- berkes 5y agoSlightly joking: https://github.com/ansuz/RIIR https://github.com/ansuz/RIIR (EDIT: I'd not propose to actually rewrite existing infra in Rust, but at least flatpack 3.0 or whatever the next version would be, would benefit from this)
- michaelmrose 5y agoThe android design from a usability perspective is garbage that has been made over with enough money and effort to be semi acceptable in the same fashion as a garbage truck would be able to fly if you attached enough rockets to it. If the Linux desktop started with a design just as good I don't think I would live long enough to see it rendered acceptable.
- sprash 5y ago> A new userspace should be built similar to Android Why do poeple always forget that Plan9 exists? The Android way is the wrong way to do it.
- kaba0 5y agoWhy do you think it has a feasible solution to security? Just because everything is a file, files themselves have inadequate permission-levels. Eg, how is the case of a USB device handled? A user can’t mount it based on file permissions, but can with a more flexible security model that looks at what is it that we are trying to mount. But my knowledge of Plan9 is not extensive so correct me if I’m wrong.
- drybjed 5y agoI think that from the security perspective, the more important change in Plan 9 was dropping the notion of a privileged "root" account. This forces you to redesign your system from the ground up. No more "root" to mount devices in the filesystem means that unprivileged users need to be able to mount things. But allowing users to mount things in the global namespace can mess things up, so instead we need to implement private per-process namespaces that users can mount and bind stuff in. Bam - containerized applications are the norm, there's no Docker, there's no Flatpak, there exists something like Kubernetes that can handle orchestration but doesn't concern itself with containerization and sandboxing. When you plug in an USB device it shows up in the list of devices. Then you can mount it as your unprivileged user in the private namespace of your own shell, no issues there with permissions. If that USB device has a filesystem that supports user/group permissions, then you have access only to the files that you own.
- kaba0 5y agoI don't think it's that easy. I'm really am not familiar with Plan 9, but I assume /dev 's analog folder is a privileged directory, where the new USB device will appear dynamically. On what basis will my user have permission to do anything with it? You need some logic there for eg. a block device available through these USB ports can have a less privileged owner. But just because it is a file/namespace, it is not a solved problem at all.
- eptcyka 5y agoWhilst I agree that more security would be great, and a capability based sandbox for applications would be cool, this is not something that Gnome can do on it's own. There should be a inter-project initiative to get this to work, as ideally this should be done at the kernel and userspace level and be DE agnostic. Flatpak kind of could do that, but I'm skeptical for now. On the other hand, maybe Gnome should copy qubes or everyone should just make qubes ready for everyday use.
- kaba0 5y agoOf course it should not be desktop-dependent, but it should be very well integrated into the DE, because it is the trusted party that can manage most of these permissions. As for Qubes, it is cool, but I don’t think that such a massive performance degradation/requirement is feasible. Also, I’m not sure how great it is from an everyday usability point of view. If the user will rather run everything in a single vm, because it doesn’t work otherwise, we are back to where we are now.
- eptcyka 5y agoThe performance isn't inherent in the design. It's perfectly feasible to have hardware accelerated graphics without passing through a whole GPU, since we have virtualization ready mesa vulkan drivers. And since you control the guest, you can dynamically scale memory use (if only one way), and everything else has negligible performance impact. As such, I think the only thing that's preventing running every application in a VM for me is the user experience, and this is by far the hardest thing to get right, but this will eventually be the gold standard.
- kaba0 5y agoI agree with you, though if we raise the bar for our threat model, running a not-too secure vm image is still not the best option.
- eptcyka 5y agoThat's an issue with the hypervisor and not the image then, but I do agree that the GPU virtualization is a large and complex attack surface. Regardless, I see these as problems that can be solved with effort.
- iforgotpassword 5y agoI don't want this, I wouldn't use this. I guess I'm just not optimistic enough to see this work: Flatpak, snap, etc don't work as they just try to make the current desktop philosophy secure, without the application and the rest of the OS really being aware of it. Android and ios have been designed to offer native features for fine grained access control and isolation. For a desktop os, you need the same, from the ground up, and every app needs to be tailored to this. You'll start with a desert and tumbleweed. This will never work, because it's simply too late: The web. A Chromebook pretty much does all the isolation you want on a different level, and is enough for the vast majority of people. I know you can now list a thousand things you cannot do in a browser and whatnot, but consider that the folks here on HN are a very rare breed. And again, as you even said, for such a hypothetical sndboxing desktop os, user space needs to be rebuilt in large parts from scratch. Not in a hundred years. There so many things that are still lacking on the linux desktop today that this would at best be yet another experimental toy OS with no real world usability. For me it's simply two separate, physical machines, one for online banking and sensitive stuff, the other for dev work, games, goofing off, and one or two android devices for other random crap. That's my sandboxing.
- kaba0 5y agoIt would be a hard change, especially with the die-hard love for C, but I don’t think that it would be impossible to make it possible, with a backward compatible escape hatch. Also, Linux user space is not famous for being binary backwards compatible, and everything being source available, I think with a clever abstraction it could potentially work.
- pdimitar 5y ago> And again, as you even said, for such a hypothetical sndboxing desktop os, user space needs to be rebuilt in large parts from scratch. Not in a hundred years. There so many things that are still lacking on the linux desktop today that this would at best be yet another experimental toy OS with no real world usability. From the several toe dips I did with Linux desktop over the years, 99.9% of all user-space GUI programs will not be missed by more than 5000 hardcore fans anyway. Rust, Zig, Nim, D -- all fine languages, and all gradually travel to having a proper UI toolkit (or solid bindings to the existing ones, more often). I happen to believe that when the solid foundation gets created we'll see an explosion of high-quality Linux desktop programs. But various problems with Qt and GTK are preventing it (licenses included)... for now.