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To be honest, I'm stealing from here: https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/11868 https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/11868 (The cost of making excuses)
by jwally 5y ago
To be honest, I'm stealing from here:
https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/11868 https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/11868 (The cost of making excuses)
Which if I understand; would go like this on explaining UFOs:
Naive Approach:
P(ALIENS) = 50%
p(~ALIENS) = 50%
Time elapses and I find some new evidence that looks like this:
P(Evidence | ALIENS) = 30%
P(Evidence | ~ALIENS) = 90%
Which gives my hypothesis (Its Aliens) a posterior probability of 25% => (50% X 30%)/(50% X 30% + 50% X 90%).
I want it to be aliens so I say that they're conducting studies on us which juices P(Evidence | ALIENS && Studying Us) = 100%. But because I have no evidence to back that up, the odds are no better than 50/50; and I have to drop the prior of my new hypothesis (UFOs are Aliens who Study us) to 25% (50% X 50%). This nets out a new posterior probability of around 27%.
P(ALIENS AND They Study Us) = 25%
p(~ALIENS) = 75%
P(Evidence | ALIENS & They Study Us) = 100%
P(Evidence | ~ALIENS) = 90%
I'm new to Bayesian logic and am still shaky with it, so there could totally be glaring errors I'm overlooking, but as I understand it that's what I was trying to get across - Every new caveat you add to explain away a poor data fit shouldn't juice your odds.
- im3w1l 5y agoIf anyone wonders why our approaches look so different, it's because I assumed ideal evidence that cleanly disproved one hypothesis without affecting any of the others. I did choose the list of hypotheses to ensure that was (approximately) valid.