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> I don't understand how you could question American ability to resupply Hawaii but not Japan's I'm claiming that if one side has a carrier and the other side

> I don't understand how you could question American ability to resupply Hawaii but not Japan's I'm claiming that if one side has a carrier and the other side doesn't, that will determine who can reliably move convoys across the pacific. The carriers have such an enormous capacity for reconnaissance, it's hard for me to imagine a convoy sneaking past them. So if Japan has a carrier dedicated to the blockade of Hawaii, it seems to me that Hawaii is effectively cut off. By contrast, the US would attempt to interdict Japanese supply convoys by using the only tool they'd have left: submarines. Better than nothing, to be sure. But it's much more difficult for a sub to find a convoy, than it is for multiple airplanes.

jcranmer 5y ago
That is not how convoys work. You're proposing using capital ships--ships of which even the largest numbers had single digit numbers--to escort convoys. This takes them out of the action for any other offensive or defensive naval operation you might want to use. Instead, you'd use destroyers (of which you have hundreds) and cruisers (merely dozens). This also lets you have several escort vessels per convoy, which is superior because two ships can be in two places at once which a single ship cannot. > By contrast, the US would attempt to interdict Japanese supply convoys by using the only tool they'd have left: submarines. Better than nothing, to be sure. But it's much more difficult for a sub to find a convoy, than it is for multiple airplanes. ... Merchant and convoy raiding by WW2 existed almost exclusively of submarines attacking convoys. The Germans did attempt using surface ships to raid convoys, but their record was absolutely abysmal, and it's pretty universally agreed among naval historians that not building those ships would have been better for Germany. Now, in 1942, the US submarine fleet was greatly hampered by the fact that the Mark 14 torpedo was a piece of shit that didn't work, and the Bureau of Ordinance refused to countenance those claims. However, the US was historically targeting Japanese shipping with submarines the entire time, and once the Mark 14 torpedo was finally fixed, the US submarine fleet would go on to be the most successful of WW2, having sunk virtually the entire Japanese shipping fleet. There's even more considerations that I'm not including here, but hopefully this should be enough to convince you that figuring fleet carrier numbers are not going to determine the victor of a battle for merchant shipping.
- jabl 5y ago
  > You're proposing using capital ships--ships of which even the largest numbers had single digit numbers--to escort convoys. This takes them out of the action for any other offensive or defensive naval operation you might want to use. Instead, you'd use destroyers (of which you have hundreds) and cruisers (merely dozens). This also lets you have several escort vessels per convoy, which is superior because two ships can be in two places at once which a single ship cannot. The Allies (mostly the US) built lots of escort carriers, precisely for escorting convoys (be it "normal" convoys or invasion fleets in the Pacific), and AFAIK they were considered pretty successful and took some of the glory of winning the battle of the Atlantic. But yeah, you can, with some justification, argue that escort carriers aren't capital ships. > The Germans did attempt using surface ships to raid convoys, but their record was absolutely abysmal IIRC the German auxiliary cruisers (HilfsKreuzer) were considered pretty successful, as they were cheap and since they were just converted merchant ships with guns etc. hidden they could often get quite close to a target before revealing themselves. But these were used for picking off lone merchantmen, not convoys. > it's pretty universally agreed among naval historians that not building those ships would have been better for Germany. Yes, the German capital ships were an almost complete waste of resources. Those resources would have been much better spent on, say, u-boats and land-based aircraft. I guess the only positive return Germany got from them was as a sort of 'fleet in being', in that their mere existence forced the allies to commit their own capital ships to the area in case they turned up to attack some convoy. Of course, had the Germans not built their own capital ships, the Allies would have also reacted, e.g. by not building or stationing their own capital ships in the area, and spending more resources on, say, anti-submarine efforts. So I'm not certain the battle of the Atlantic would have turned out any different in this case either, just even more bloody.

jcranmer 5y ago

That is not how convoys work. You're proposing using capital ships--ships of which even the largest numbers had single digit numbers--to escort convoys. This takes them out of the action for any other offensive or defensive naval operation you might want to use. Instead, you'd use destroyers (of which you have hundreds) and cruisers (merely dozens). This also lets you have several escort vessels per convoy, which is superior because two ships can be in two places at once which a single ship cannot. > By contrast, the US would attempt to interdict Japanese supply convoys by using the only tool they'd have left: submarines. Better than nothing, to be sure. But it's much more difficult for a sub to find a convoy, than it is for multiple airplanes. ... Merchant and convoy raiding by WW2 existed almost exclusively of submarines attacking convoys. The Germans did attempt using surface ships to raid convoys, but their record was absolutely abysmal, and it's pretty universally agreed among naval historians that not building those ships would have been better for Germany. Now, in 1942, the US submarine fleet was greatly hampered by the fact that the Mark 14 torpedo was a piece of shit that didn't work, and the Bureau of Ordinance refused to countenance those claims. However, the US was historically targeting Japanese shipping with submarines the entire time, and once the Mark 14 torpedo was finally fixed, the US submarine fleet would go on to be the most successful of WW2, having sunk virtually the entire Japanese shipping fleet. There's even more considerations that I'm not including here, but hopefully this should be enough to convince you that figuring fleet carrier numbers are not going to determine the victor of a battle for merchant shipping.

jabl 5y ago
> You're proposing using capital ships--ships of which even the largest numbers had single digit numbers--to escort convoys. This takes them out of the action for any other offensive or defensive naval operation you might want to use. Instead, you'd use destroyers (of which you have hundreds) and cruisers (merely dozens). This also lets you have several escort vessels per convoy, which is superior because two ships can be in two places at once which a single ship cannot. The Allies (mostly the US) built lots of escort carriers, precisely for escorting convoys (be it "normal" convoys or invasion fleets in the Pacific), and AFAIK they were considered pretty successful and took some of the glory of winning the battle of the Atlantic. But yeah, you can, with some justification, argue that escort carriers aren't capital ships. > The Germans did attempt using surface ships to raid convoys, but their record was absolutely abysmal IIRC the German auxiliary cruisers (HilfsKreuzer) were considered pretty successful, as they were cheap and since they were just converted merchant ships with guns etc. hidden they could often get quite close to a target before revealing themselves. But these were used for picking off lone merchantmen, not convoys. > it's pretty universally agreed among naval historians that not building those ships would have been better for Germany. Yes, the German capital ships were an almost complete waste of resources. Those resources would have been much better spent on, say, u-boats and land-based aircraft. I guess the only positive return Germany got from them was as a sort of 'fleet in being', in that their mere existence forced the allies to commit their own capital ships to the area in case they turned up to attack some convoy. Of course, had the Germans not built their own capital ships, the Allies would have also reacted, e.g. by not building or stationing their own capital ships in the area, and spending more resources on, say, anti-submarine efforts. So I'm not certain the battle of the Atlantic would have turned out any different in this case either, just even more bloody.