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Well first, IPv6 doesn't need NAT, and mostly never uses NAT. If IPv6 devices used NAT, they would be protected. But since they aren't using NAT, they aren't pr

Well first, IPv6 doesn't need NAT, and mostly never uses NAT. If IPv6 devices used NAT, they would be protected. But since they aren't using NAT, they aren't protected. You're right that devices that enable IPv6 (and network routers that give out IPv6 addresses) are not protected by NAT, but luckily it's still a small amount of traffic/devices worldwide. But this is changing, and so NAT won't help people for much longer. Second, SPI isn't used for security here. It's true that SPI is used by NAT, and that SPI can be used to prevent, say, a specially crafted packet from passing from a public network through a router into a private network. But something other than SPI has to actually enforce that. That "something" is usually extra features of the network stack, like disabling source-routing, reverse-path filtering, ARP filtering, etc. All SPI is doing is helping the NAT engine track the connections it is translating. For "good faith" traffic (that is, not crafted by an attacker to work around crappy NAT routers) NAT still provides security. Actually it's not NAT at all that's providing the security - it's just the routing. You can't pass traffic from a public network into a private network, and almost all devices behind NAT are on private networks. So NAT provides security merely by keeping devices on a private network.

throw0101a 5y ago
> But since they aren't using NAT, they aren't protected. I just demonstrated that protection exists without NAT. > […] but luckily it's still a small amount of traffic/devices worldwide. I don't think this is correct. Just about all devices on a cellular/mobile network nowadays are probably using IPv6 natively, with CGNAT for IPv4. That's a lot of devices. * https://blogs.akamai.com/2016/06/preparing-for-ipv6-only-mobile-networks-why-and-how.html https://blogs.akamai.com/2016/06/preparing-for-ipv6-only-mob... An experiment: temporarily disable Wifi on your cell phone, go to your browser, search of "what is my ip address". Chances are that you'll see an IPv6 address there: if using Google they'll return something an IPv6 address at the top, and a list of different web sites that do the same thing. If you go to a website you'll probably get an IPv6 and an IPv4 address. > But something other than SPI has to actually enforce that. Connection tracking is sufficient for most modern protocols (i.e., not (active) FTP): > A stateful firewall keeps track of the state of network connections, such as TCP streams, UDP datagrams, and ICMP messages, and can apply labels such as LISTEN, ESTABLISHED, or CLOSING.[2] State table entries are created for TCP streams or UDP datagrams that are allowed to communicate through the firewall in accordance with the configured security policy. Once in the table, all RELATED packets of a stored session are streamlined allowed, taking less CPU cycles than standard inspection. Related packets are also permitted to return through the firewall even if no rule is configured to allow communications from that host. * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stateful_firewall https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stateful_firewall * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Connection_tracking https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Connectio... > Actually it's not NAT at all that's providing the security - it's just the routing. Yes, that's exactly my point. And as part of routing packets one can inspect their headers and drop or allow them as desired.
- throwawaaarrgh 5y ago
  I think we're sort of agreeing on the same things. NAT protects devices, and stateful firewalls protect devices, and if you have neither, you're not protected. My point was that more devices exist behind NAT than come bundled with a stateful firewall, hence NAT protects more devices. The NAT devices/routers might additionally have a stateful firewall (which really only protects the router, not the other devices), but I wouldn't trust it as much as the security of a non-routable network.
  - throw0101a 5y ago
    > My point was that more devices exist behind NAT than come bundled with a stateful firewall, hence NAT protects more devices. The popularity of a mechanism does not necessarily correlate with the effectiveness of its security. The fact that we're using IPv4 with NAT+SPI versus IPv6 with SPI is simply an accident of history. If IPv4 had been designed with 64-bit addresses, or even 48-bit ones (like Ethernet MACs, which we still haven't run out of), then NAT probably would not have been invented, and we'd be using 'simple' (SPI) firewalls (see Cheswick 1994). > […] but I wouldn't trust it as much as the security of a non-routable network. Non-routable networks are not more secure than routable ones with SPI; at best the two are equal IMHO. Non-routable networks may actually be worse because of a false sense of security: all it may take is one end-point compromise and the enemy is one the other side of the moat.

throw0101a 5y ago

> But since they aren't using NAT, they aren't protected. I just demonstrated that protection exists without NAT. > […] but luckily it's still a small amount of traffic/devices worldwide. I don't think this is correct. Just about all devices on a cellular/mobile network nowadays are probably using IPv6 natively, with CGNAT for IPv4. That's a lot of devices. * https://blogs.akamai.com/2016/06/preparing-for-ipv6-only-mobile-networks-why-and-how.html https://blogs.akamai.com/2016/06/preparing-for-ipv6-only-mob... An experiment: temporarily disable Wifi on your cell phone, go to your browser, search of "what is my ip address". Chances are that you'll see an IPv6 address there: if using Google they'll return something an IPv6 address at the top, and a list of different web sites that do the same thing. If you go to a website you'll probably get an IPv6 and an IPv4 address. > But something other than SPI has to actually enforce that. Connection tracking is sufficient for most modern protocols (i.e., not (active) FTP): > A stateful firewall keeps track of the state of network connections, such as TCP streams, UDP datagrams, and ICMP messages, and can apply labels such as LISTEN, ESTABLISHED, or CLOSING.[2] State table entries are created for TCP streams or UDP datagrams that are allowed to communicate through the firewall in accordance with the configured security policy. Once in the table, all RELATED packets of a stored session are streamlined allowed, taking less CPU cycles than standard inspection. Related packets are also permitted to return through the firewall even if no rule is configured to allow communications from that host. * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stateful_firewall https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stateful_firewall * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Connection_tracking https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Connectio... > Actually it's not NAT at all that's providing the security - it's just the routing. Yes, that's exactly my point. And as part of routing packets one can inspect their headers and drop or allow them as desired.

throwawaaarrgh 5y ago
I think we're sort of agreeing on the same things. NAT protects devices, and stateful firewalls protect devices, and if you have neither, you're not protected. My point was that more devices exist behind NAT than come bundled with a stateful firewall, hence NAT protects more devices. The NAT devices/routers might additionally have a stateful firewall (which really only protects the router, not the other devices), but I wouldn't trust it as much as the security of a non-routable network.
- throw0101a 5y ago
  > My point was that more devices exist behind NAT than come bundled with a stateful firewall, hence NAT protects more devices. The popularity of a mechanism does not necessarily correlate with the effectiveness of its security. The fact that we're using IPv4 with NAT+SPI versus IPv6 with SPI is simply an accident of history. If IPv4 had been designed with 64-bit addresses, or even 48-bit ones (like Ethernet MACs, which we still haven't run out of), then NAT probably would not have been invented, and we'd be using 'simple' (SPI) firewalls (see Cheswick 1994). > […] but I wouldn't trust it as much as the security of a non-routable network. Non-routable networks are not more secure than routable ones with SPI; at best the two are equal IMHO. Non-routable networks may actually be worse because of a false sense of security: all it may take is one end-point compromise and the enemy is one the other side of the moat.