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Not at all. You want to prevent robots from logging in as other users, for example when trying credentials stuffing.
by Xylakant 5y ago
Not at all. You want to prevent robots from logging in as other users, for example when trying credentials stuffing.
- chrismorgan 5y agoThat’s what per-IP and per-user rate limiting is for—by themselves, those two are close to sufficient. Any form of CAPTCHA would be a terrible sole defence (such things don’t block bots, they just make it a bit more expensive and help a bit with drive-by attacks), and adds very little for defence-in-depth, while introducing new problems where you inconvenience and block access to your real customers. I find the inclusion of reCAPTCHA on a login page of a supposedly security-conscious entity very surprising. (Sign up is a different matter; there it will have very meaningful benefits and lower costs.)
- Xylakant 5y agoPer user does not help when doing credential stuffing - the attacker tries known credentials from a leak, it’s not random cracking. Per IP blocks can be circumvented by using a botnet and slowing your attack.
- wearywanderer 5y agoWhat we have here is users who don't re-use passwords being inconvenienced to protect those who do. Doubtlessly this is very progressive, as those who reuse passwords have less "has a fucking clue"-privilege. But nonetheless this does not sit right with me.
- chrismorgan 5y agoThose things are why I said close to sufficient, not sufficient. For best results you will want some other form of behaviour analysis also. But reCAPTCHA suffers from serious problems too; it’s easy to find turn-key reCAPTCHA-solving services at under $1 per thousand. So reCAPTCHA is a deterrent, but far from inviolate, and for most of the kinds of attacks we’re talking about here it’s not even a particularly severe deterrent. (It would be for comment spam, since the value of each attempted submission is negligible, but for credential stuffing the expected value of each attempt is much higher.)