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my working hypothesis on spectrums of all sorts is that we inevitably misrepresent the extremes as separate phenomena (because, strong esteem boost for the “dis
by clairity 5y ago
my working hypothesis on spectrums of all sorts is that we inevitably misrepresent the extremes as separate phenomena (because, strong esteem boost for the “discoverer”), rather than the ends of a continuous distribution, and that causes us to misunderstand all sorts of as-yet-unexplained phenomena as problems. severe autism certainly looks like something different, but we’ve let the label, and the stigmatization that inevitably follows, to trickle down the distribution until it butts unnaturally right up against “normal” (asperger’s, in this example), creating cognitive dissonances we can’t reconcile. you also see this with adhd, introversion/extroversion, and all sorts of psychosocial categorizations.
- skissane 5y ago> severe autism certainly looks like something different Some authors [0] have criticised that idea though. Severe ASD very often (but not always) co-occurs with intellectual disability, but intellectual disability with and without ASD don't actually look that different from each other, and we really have to ask how useful it is to distinguish ASD from non-ASD in cases of intellectual disability. Added to that, in many jurisdictions people with an ASD diagnosis get better services, so there is continuing pressure to reclassify people from ID without ASD to ID with ASD, not justified on any scientific grounds, but simply because they'll get better supports with the ASD label than without it. That has driven a lot of diagnostic substitution from pure ID to ID+ASD, and lends support to the argument that the whole thing is more about society and culture than actual science [0] see for example Graham Collins, "Does a Diagnosis of ASD Help Us to Help a Person with Intellectual Disabilities?" in Katherine Runswick-Cole, Rebecca Mallett, Sami Timimi (editors). Re-Thinking Autism: Diagnosis, Identity and Equality. Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2016. pp. 204–220
- clairity 5y agoyah, such misdiagnoses are a perversion created by the financial incentives at play in psychosocial disorders. it certainly doesn’t help with treatment, only with getting paid for it, dropping negative externalities on the patient along the way. i have a therapist friend who has said as much using different words. my main point, which i think coincides with the underlying thread of yours, is that (many/most) named disorders are extremes of the human condition, so instead of looking for “what’s wrong”, let’s look for “what’s too much/too little” about them. and for the non-severe versions, let’s mostly just broaden the definition of “normal” to include them and just collectively get better at cherishing and accommodating the amazing diversity of human experience.