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"it needs to be done in the hardware itself (ie. keys burned into the silicon)" - this isn't true; this is confusing Trusted Boot and Secure Boot, which are not
by hlandau 5y ago
"it needs to be done in the hardware itself (ie. keys burned into the silicon)" - this isn't true; this is confusing Trusted Boot and Secure Boot, which are not the same thing (nor is it the only way of implementing Secure Boot).
Owner-controlled remote attestation is entirely viable, e.g. Talos II is capable of this with a FlexVer module.
- gruez 5y ago> "it needs to be done in the hardware itself (ie. keys burned into the silicon)" - this isn't true; this is confusing Trusted Boot and Secure Boot, which are not the same thing (nor is it the only way of implementing Secure Boot). I meant as opposed to keys/signing done in software. >Owner-controlled remote attestation is entirely viable, e.g. Talos II is capable of this with a FlexVer module. I skimmed the product brief[1] and it looks like it's basically a TPM that has a secure communications channel (as opposed to LPC which can be MITMed)? I'm not really sure how this is an improvement, because you're still relying on the hardware vendor to send the PCR values. So at the end of the day you still have to trust the hardware vendor, although the signing is done by you, but I'm not really sure how this adds any benefit. [1] https://www.raptorengineering.com/TALOS/documentation/flexver_intro.pdf https://www.raptorengineering.com/TALOS/documentation/flexve...
- p_l 5y agoFlexVer doesn't hardcode any keys - you can fully reinitialize the TPM to your liking, but doing so destroys any secrets already stored. So the trick is that you initialize it for your infrastructure and have to do secure reprovisioning if it ever fails to provide the same key answers (which would indicate tampering)