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Didn't we have that equilibrium (sorta) with USSR? I don't think it was a good kind of equilibrium - mutually assured destruction and all.
by cozos 5y ago
Didn't we have that equilibrium (sorta) with USSR? I don't think it was a good kind of equilibrium - mutually assured destruction and all.
- sandworm101 5y agoNope. Pick any point in history and there was a huge imbalance between the sides. Often such "gaps" were unrecognized at the time, but each side would later learn that their perception of the other was incorrect. The "missile gap" and "bomber gap" were illusory. The public picture, the one on which budgets were based, was disconnected from the intelligence picture which was in turn often disconnected from the on-the-ground reality. Those involved at each stage of abstraction turned the information to suit their own needs. People who sold airplanes in the US counted extra bombers in the USSR. The people who drafted budgets counted more troops in the opposing army. In the end they all got what they wanted: massive spending on material. An interesting example is the number of ICBMs programs on both sides. The engineering culture within the USSR meant that it had many different missile designs, some only ever resulting in a handful of missiles. Missiles would have short service lives and then be replaced by a new model. The Americans were different. They stuck to a smaller number of designs but mass produced and maintained them for decades. Both sides perceived that the other "had more missiles" because they were effectively counting them differently. The USSR saw American missile factories churning out missiles. The US saw a flood of new designs on parade and assumed they were being mass produced. Such cultural splits continue to inflate budgets today.