2 ms·
ECC doesn't prevent rowhammer, but it makes it a lot easier to spot. If you flip only one bit, that will at least increase a correctable error count. It you fl
by toast0 5y ago
ECC doesn't prevent rowhammer, but it makes it a lot easier to spot.
If you flip only one bit, that will at least increase a correctable error count. It you flip only two bits, most OSes will panic, although sophisticated OSes can kill only the process which had that address mapped, or take that address out of the mapping and kill the process on access, etc. It's only if you flip three bits that it might be undetected.
From what I've seen the probability of flipping one or two bits is much higher than three or more, so ECC is useful to probabalistically turn a security bypass into a denial of service.
- benlivengood 5y agoGCP at least takes the approach of monitoring single and double bit flips to kill offending VMs. There's also a potential performance tradeoff (no idea if GCP is using this) of running some single channel DIMMs for isolating VMs from the kernel and kvm userspace. Reference: https://www.google.com/amp/s/cloudblog.withgoogle.com/products/gcp/7-ways-we-harden-our-kvm-hypervisor-at-google-cloud-security-in-plaintext/amp/ https://www.google.com/amp/s/cloudblog.withgoogle.com/produc...