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> when provided with evidence showing that any other WhatsApp user is infringing Zee’s copyrights by selling copies of its film, WhatsApp must suspend the corre

> when provided with evidence showing that any other WhatsApp user is infringing Zee’s copyrights by selling copies of its film, WhatsApp must suspend the corresponding accounts within 24 hours. So this does not require Whatsapp/Facebook to proactively monitor its network and suspend users who share it (if it did and Facebook complied, it would disprove their claim that e2e encryption as they use it provides sufficient privacy).

freeone3000 5y ago
Facebook manages the keys, and can download your entire chat history to a new device. What privacy is their implementation actually providing?
- tgsovlerkhgsel 5y ago
  As I understand it, with backups disabled, at least the text messages are protected. I would expect file contents of unknown files to be protected but file hashes to potentially leak.
- calt 5y ago
  Do they manage the private keys? I always thought that they only managed the public keys. I thought that your backup is stored in iCloud or Google Drive unencrypted. Facebook doesn't have direct access to that. You phone must be already logged in to those services.
  - cesarb 5y ago
    AFAIK, there are two kinds of private keys here. There's one key used to encrypt the backups, which can be either local (on the device) or sent to Google's or Apple's servers; that key is AFAIK kept by Facebook (unlike Signal which asks you to write it down), but it's useless without the backup files, which most probably Facebook cannot access directly. The other key is the ratcheting end-to-end encryption key, and AFAIK that's only kept by the device itself; if you have the right option enabled, you can see whenever someone you're talking to installs WhatsApp or Signal on a new device, since you'll be warned that the key has changed.
  - wyldfire 5y ago
    They broker the public key exchanges and IIRC the clients trust the broker when it claims that the previous key owner (definitely not Eve) has generated a new keypair. There is a setting (opt-in!) to even see when this occurs but once it does your oh-so-compliant client has already re-encrypted the old messages with the recipient's new pub key and sent them along. This behavior is by design. Some folks will tell me "but it's end-to-end!" and it feels kinda like they're telling me that it's "what plants crave." EDIT: if you don't believe me, turn on the setting, have a friend reinstall the app and watch the re-keying happen. It's indistinguishable from an attack unless you trust the broker. If you trust the broker, then why claim it's "end to end"? Also refer to the various articles that describe this behavior that WhatsApp says is by design. Double EDIT: why is it this way by design? Because it would be a PITA if every time you replaced your lost phone your buddies got a warning that looked like "Either Dave has got a new phone or the NSA is attacking you. Resend ten years of hilarious memes and intimate conversations to whoever is on the other end?" Real cryptography comes with real inconveniences when you lose your keys. It's the same kind of headache with securing cryptocoins - if you lose the secrets you lose the money. Trusting an agent is the only way to escape, but it comes at a significant cost. Cryptocoin custodians like exchanges get attacked all the time. And communication broker/relays get lawful intercepts all the time.
    - cesarb 5y ago
      > Resend ten years of hilarious memes and intimate conversations to whoever is on the other end? AFAIK, it won't resend already received messages; if the other end didn't have a backup, these ten years of old messages are lost for that end. I don't know whether it will resend sent but not yet received messages, and it certainly will use the new key for new messages (but at that point, you already received the "key changed" alert).
petronio 5y ago
It says "when provided with evidence", so I would assume it doesn't require active monitoring from WhatsApp and is more like a DMCA takedown request.
- sp332 5y ago
  Yeah but a DMCA takedown is focused on the content, not on deleting a user's account. Not after one "strike", anyway.
  - mrzimmerman 5y ago
    That’s true but the Digital Millennium Copyright Act is a US law and this is an Indian court. So it’s similar in that what has to be reported is the act of a user sharing the content, but the reaction the platform has to take is different.
- elliekelly 5y ago
  I’m not sure I would consider a DMCA takedown request “evidence”.
- WhyNotHugo 5y ago
  Odd narration though. What constitutes "sufficient evidence"? Is WhatsApp now the judge of this?
  - petronio 5y ago
    Most likely, because if they refuse and it's infringing then it's them (WhatsApp) getting dragged to court for not following the court's orders. I suspect it'll end up similar to how most service providers handle DMCA takedowns: honor it without question. If it's invalid, the affected party can take it up with whoever submitted the request as far as WhatsApp is concerned.
Legogris 5y ago
Anecdata: I recently shared a private FB event link with a friend over WhatsApp (DM, not group chat) while we were in the same room. She saw and opened it. Some hours later it was gone from both of our chat histories on all devices, with no notice of deleted messages. Earlier and later messages were intact. I don't see how this could happen if that claim was true.
- dartharva 5y ago
  When did this happen? They hadn't implemented E2E Encryption before 2016.
  - Legogris 5y ago
    During 2021.
    - lifty 5y ago
      Regardless of e2ee, they might have code bundled in the WhatsApp app that just deletes local video messages based on a hash. That wouldn’t break encryption.
      - Legogris 5y ago
        It was an event link, think: > The event next week: > https://.... (Neither of us remember if those two lines were distinct messages or two lines in the same message; regardless, neither is there anymore)
      - tffgg 5y ago
        Same message doesn't mean same hash. Usually a nonce is used and if not: WhatsApp uses the Signal Protocol, which uses different keys for each message
        jeroenhd 5y ago
        The client can delete the message if the decrypted hash matches a certain blacklist. It doesn't have to happen on the FB servers. Such a mechanism allows governments to turn WhatsApp into a propaganda machine very easily, though, so I'm not sure if I would consider such a mechanism for my app if I were in a similar position.
thaumasiotes 5y ago
> if it did and Facebook complied, it would disprove their claim that e2e encryption as they use it provides sufficient privacy You made me envision this "end-to-end encryption" scheme: - Alice sends a message to Bob. True to its word, WhatsApp encrypts the message on Alice's client and transmits it through to Bob without the WhatsApp server ever being able to read the message. - Bob receives the message, which is decrypted for his viewing by his WhatsApp client. - Bob's WhatsApp client reads the message and reports it back to the WhatsApp server.
- henearkr 5y ago
  Exactly. So e2e makes sense only when the client is open source too. Signal got this right.
- cantrevealname 5y ago
  > Bob's WhatsApp client reads the message and reports it back to the WhatsApp server. In every copy of the app, WhatsApp explicitly says, "Your messages, calls and status updates stay between you and the people you choose. Not even WhatsApp can read or listen to them." Of course, the scenario you describe is possible, but WhatsApp would be lying.
  - dTal 5y ago
    >Not even WhatsApp can read or listen to them WhatsApp is already lying. It can, as demonstrated above.
  - WhyNotHugo 5y ago
    WhatsApp's TOS uses to state that the encryption key stays on device. This changed a few months ago.
  - PeterisP 5y ago
    A lawyer could argue that sending a hash of the transmitted file (or, preferably, locally verifying the hash against a blacklist) is substantially different from sending/reading its contents.
pjc50 5y ago
The encryption may be E2E. The key management is obviously central, as you can figure out by asking how whatsapp web works.
- BenjiWiebe 5y ago
  WhatsApp Web works by reading/sending messages through your phone.
pmlnr 5y ago
> So this does not require Whatsapp/Facebook to proactively monitor its network Welcome to Article 11 & 13: https://juliareda.eu/eu-copyright-reform/ https://juliareda.eu/eu-copyright-reform/
- Kbelicius 5y ago
  FFS, those do not require active monitoring. Article 17, formerly known as article 13, explicitly states: "8. The application of this Article shall not lead to any general monitoring obligation. ".
  - tremon 5y ago
    general in that statement is a weasel word, and including it in the official article text is a clear indication of intent: "Yes, we recognize this requires setting up a monitoring infrastructure for compliance with the article, but we reserve the right to publicly condemn any company that uses that same infrastructure for self-serving purposes."
  - pmlnr 5y ago
    Lol. Then how else can it be followed?
    - Kbelicius 5y ago
      You could, you know, read the article before you start spreading FUD about it. Maybe the answers you seek are in it. In the end it doesn't matter how it will be followed. If general monitoring is the only way to follow it then nobody needs to follow it. Simple as that.
      - pmlnr 5y ago
        Time will tell. Sadly, in my read, "no general monitoring" and "mandatory upload filters" are not the same, and thus, not mutually exclusive.

freeone3000 5y ago

Facebook manages the keys, and can download your entire chat history to a new device. What privacy is their implementation actually providing?

tgsovlerkhgsel 5y ago
As I understand it, with backups disabled, at least the text messages are protected. I would expect file contents of unknown files to be protected but file hashes to potentially leak.
calt 5y ago
Do they manage the private keys? I always thought that they only managed the public keys. I thought that your backup is stored in iCloud or Google Drive unencrypted. Facebook doesn't have direct access to that. You phone must be already logged in to those services.
- cesarb 5y ago
  AFAIK, there are two kinds of private keys here. There's one key used to encrypt the backups, which can be either local (on the device) or sent to Google's or Apple's servers; that key is AFAIK kept by Facebook (unlike Signal which asks you to write it down), but it's useless without the backup files, which most probably Facebook cannot access directly. The other key is the ratcheting end-to-end encryption key, and AFAIK that's only kept by the device itself; if you have the right option enabled, you can see whenever someone you're talking to installs WhatsApp or Signal on a new device, since you'll be warned that the key has changed.
- wyldfire 5y ago
  They broker the public key exchanges and IIRC the clients trust the broker when it claims that the previous key owner (definitely not Eve) has generated a new keypair. There is a setting (opt-in!) to even see when this occurs but once it does your oh-so-compliant client has already re-encrypted the old messages with the recipient's new pub key and sent them along. This behavior is by design. Some folks will tell me "but it's end-to-end!" and it feels kinda like they're telling me that it's "what plants crave." EDIT: if you don't believe me, turn on the setting, have a friend reinstall the app and watch the re-keying happen. It's indistinguishable from an attack unless you trust the broker. If you trust the broker, then why claim it's "end to end"? Also refer to the various articles that describe this behavior that WhatsApp says is by design. Double EDIT: why is it this way by design? Because it would be a PITA if every time you replaced your lost phone your buddies got a warning that looked like "Either Dave has got a new phone or the NSA is attacking you. Resend ten years of hilarious memes and intimate conversations to whoever is on the other end?" Real cryptography comes with real inconveniences when you lose your keys. It's the same kind of headache with securing cryptocoins - if you lose the secrets you lose the money. Trusting an agent is the only way to escape, but it comes at a significant cost. Cryptocoin custodians like exchanges get attacked all the time. And communication broker/relays get lawful intercepts all the time.
  - cesarb 5y ago
    > Resend ten years of hilarious memes and intimate conversations to whoever is on the other end? AFAIK, it won't resend already received messages; if the other end didn't have a backup, these ten years of old messages are lost for that end. I don't know whether it will resend sent but not yet received messages, and it certainly will use the new key for new messages (but at that point, you already received the "key changed" alert).

petronio 5y ago

It says "when provided with evidence", so I would assume it doesn't require active monitoring from WhatsApp and is more like a DMCA takedown request.

sp332 5y ago
Yeah but a DMCA takedown is focused on the content, not on deleting a user's account. Not after one "strike", anyway.
- mrzimmerman 5y ago
  That’s true but the Digital Millennium Copyright Act is a US law and this is an Indian court. So it’s similar in that what has to be reported is the act of a user sharing the content, but the reaction the platform has to take is different.
elliekelly 5y ago
I’m not sure I would consider a DMCA takedown request “evidence”.
WhyNotHugo 5y ago
Odd narration though. What constitutes "sufficient evidence"? Is WhatsApp now the judge of this?
- petronio 5y ago
  Most likely, because if they refuse and it's infringing then it's them (WhatsApp) getting dragged to court for not following the court's orders. I suspect it'll end up similar to how most service providers handle DMCA takedowns: honor it without question. If it's invalid, the affected party can take it up with whoever submitted the request as far as WhatsApp is concerned.

Legogris 5y ago

Anecdata: I recently shared a private FB event link with a friend over WhatsApp (DM, not group chat) while we were in the same room. She saw and opened it. Some hours later it was gone from both of our chat histories on all devices, with no notice of deleted messages. Earlier and later messages were intact. I don't see how this could happen if that claim was true.

dartharva 5y ago
When did this happen? They hadn't implemented E2E Encryption before 2016.
- Legogris 5y ago
  During 2021.
  - lifty 5y ago
    Regardless of e2ee, they might have code bundled in the WhatsApp app that just deletes local video messages based on a hash. That wouldn’t break encryption.
    - Legogris 5y ago
      It was an event link, think: > The event next week: > https://.... (Neither of us remember if those two lines were distinct messages or two lines in the same message; regardless, neither is there anymore)
    - tffgg 5y ago
      Same message doesn't mean same hash. Usually a nonce is used and if not: WhatsApp uses the Signal Protocol, which uses different keys for each message
      - jeroenhd 5y ago
        The client can delete the message if the decrypted hash matches a certain blacklist. It doesn't have to happen on the FB servers. Such a mechanism allows governments to turn WhatsApp into a propaganda machine very easily, though, so I'm not sure if I would consider such a mechanism for my app if I were in a similar position.

thaumasiotes 5y ago

> if it did and Facebook complied, it would disprove their claim that e2e encryption as they use it provides sufficient privacy You made me envision this "end-to-end encryption" scheme: - Alice sends a message to Bob. True to its word, WhatsApp encrypts the message on Alice's client and transmits it through to Bob without the WhatsApp server ever being able to read the message. - Bob receives the message, which is decrypted for his viewing by his WhatsApp client. - Bob's WhatsApp client reads the message and reports it back to the WhatsApp server.

henearkr 5y ago
Exactly. So e2e makes sense only when the client is open source too. Signal got this right.
cantrevealname 5y ago
> Bob's WhatsApp client reads the message and reports it back to the WhatsApp server. In every copy of the app, WhatsApp explicitly says, "Your messages, calls and status updates stay between you and the people you choose. Not even WhatsApp can read or listen to them." Of course, the scenario you describe is possible, but WhatsApp would be lying.
- dTal 5y ago
  >Not even WhatsApp can read or listen to them WhatsApp is already lying. It can, as demonstrated above.
- WhyNotHugo 5y ago
  WhatsApp's TOS uses to state that the encryption key stays on device. This changed a few months ago.
- PeterisP 5y ago
  A lawyer could argue that sending a hash of the transmitted file (or, preferably, locally verifying the hash against a blacklist) is substantially different from sending/reading its contents.

pjc50 5y ago

The encryption may be E2E. The key management is obviously central, as you can figure out by asking how whatsapp web works.

BenjiWiebe 5y ago
WhatsApp Web works by reading/sending messages through your phone.

pmlnr 5y ago

> So this does not require Whatsapp/Facebook to proactively monitor its network Welcome to Article 11 & 13: https://juliareda.eu/eu-copyright-reform/ https://juliareda.eu/eu-copyright-reform/

Kbelicius 5y ago
FFS, those do not require active monitoring. Article 17, formerly known as article 13, explicitly states: "8. The application of this Article shall not lead to any general monitoring obligation. ".
- tremon 5y ago
  general in that statement is a weasel word, and including it in the official article text is a clear indication of intent: "Yes, we recognize this requires setting up a monitoring infrastructure for compliance with the article, but we reserve the right to publicly condemn any company that uses that same infrastructure for self-serving purposes."
- pmlnr 5y ago
  Lol. Then how else can it be followed?
  - Kbelicius 5y ago
    You could, you know, read the article before you start spreading FUD about it. Maybe the answers you seek are in it. In the end it doesn't matter how it will be followed. If general monitoring is the only way to follow it then nobody needs to follow it. Simple as that.
    - pmlnr 5y ago
      Time will tell. Sadly, in my read, "no general monitoring" and "mandatory upload filters" are not the same, and thus, not mutually exclusive.