3 ms·
If I'm understanding the exploit correctly. An attacker could be doing a mitm on the server, and be able to determine if it is a first time connection. Then if
by dec0dedab0de 5y ago
If I'm understanding the exploit correctly. An attacker could be doing a mitm on the server, and be able to determine if it is a first time connection. Then if it is a first time connection they could intercept and pass along their own key to the client. Since it's the clients first connection they would probably just accept it. Without this technique, the attacker would have to intercept all the traffic and would then be more likely to get caught.
I think it would probably be better if there was a standard for an out of band way to validate the servers public key. Like store a hash in a DNS txt record or something.
- gaadd33 5y agoSounds like you are looking for an SSHFP dns record: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SSHFP_record https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SSHFP_record
- sneak 5y agoThe fact that these are a special RR type and not TXT means that I can't use them with any of the current DNS hosts I use on any of my domains. :(
- throw0101a 5y ago> I think it would probably be better if there was a standard for an out of band way to validate the servers public key. In addition to the mentioned SSHFP record, OpensSSH 8.0 added: > ssh(1): When prompting whether to record a new host key, accept the key fingerprint as a synonym for "yes". This allows the user to paste a fingerprint obtained out of band at the prompt and have the client do the comparison for you. * https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-8.0 https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-8.0