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I view it as a cost-benefit analysis between implementing security by obscurity versus actual security. If you have real security, then you don't need security

I view it as a cost-benefit analysis between implementing security by obscurity versus actual security. If you have real security, then you don't need security by obscurity. If you have security by obscurity, you still need real security. So it's obvious which is a better ROI. That's not to say security by obscurity layered on top can't be useful, such as filtering out noise, but I think the point most people are trying to make is "this thing is not a solution to your security problem, it is a potentially dangerous distraction".

mindcrime 5y ago
If you have real security, then you don't need security by obscurity. If you have security by obscurity, you still need real security. If "real security" was a real thing and anybody knew how to actually do that, things like the Colonial Pipeline ransom-ware attack, etc. wouldn't happen all the time. As people have been saying since David Lightman in 1983 "Hey, I don't believe that any system is totally secure." That's not to say security by obscurity layered on top can't be useful I think that most people who would implement this (or similar schemes) realize exactly that, and are practicing "defense in depth". Could it be a "dangerous distraction?" Sure, in principle. But I don't see any particular reason that this would be more so than other elements of a "defense in depth" strategy.
- not_kurt_godel 5y ago
  "real security" means security that is not dependent on secrecy of implementation to remain secure. In the context of this post, it means configuring key-based access and disabling password-based access. If you do this, then the security-by-obscurity-based technique in the OP is unnecessary and redundant. Could key-based SSH access theoretically be cracked? Maybe (probably not, but let's say maybe for the sake of argument). But if so, a rotating listening address is probably no obstacle to an attacker of that caliber.
  - mindcrime 5y ago
    Could key-based SSH access theoretically be cracked? Maybe (probably not, but let's say maybe for the sake of argument). Of course it could. Unless you're really going to posit that there are no bugs in any widely deployed ssh server implementations. Doesn't seem very likely to me. Anyway... if you're being specifically targeted by a highly advanced adversary, it probably doesn't matter what you do. I tend to assume that most of us, most of the time, are not in that position, and should employ a layered, "defense in depth" strategy. Whether or not this specific technique is something worth deploying or not is an open question to me. My position is simply that we shouldn't just dismiss it out of hand without deeper consideration.

mindcrime 5y ago

If you have real security, then you don't need security by obscurity. If you have security by obscurity, you still need real security. If "real security" was a real thing and anybody knew how to actually do that, things like the Colonial Pipeline ransom-ware attack, etc. wouldn't happen all the time. As people have been saying since David Lightman in 1983 "Hey, I don't believe that any system is totally secure." That's not to say security by obscurity layered on top can't be useful I think that most people who would implement this (or similar schemes) realize exactly that, and are practicing "defense in depth". Could it be a "dangerous distraction?" Sure, in principle. But I don't see any particular reason that this would be more so than other elements of a "defense in depth" strategy.

not_kurt_godel 5y ago
"real security" means security that is not dependent on secrecy of implementation to remain secure. In the context of this post, it means configuring key-based access and disabling password-based access. If you do this, then the security-by-obscurity-based technique in the OP is unnecessary and redundant. Could key-based SSH access theoretically be cracked? Maybe (probably not, but let's say maybe for the sake of argument). But if so, a rotating listening address is probably no obstacle to an attacker of that caliber.
- mindcrime 5y ago
  Could key-based SSH access theoretically be cracked? Maybe (probably not, but let's say maybe for the sake of argument). Of course it could. Unless you're really going to posit that there are no bugs in any widely deployed ssh server implementations. Doesn't seem very likely to me. Anyway... if you're being specifically targeted by a highly advanced adversary, it probably doesn't matter what you do. I tend to assume that most of us, most of the time, are not in that position, and should employ a layered, "defense in depth" strategy. Whether or not this specific technique is something worth deploying or not is an open question to me. My position is simply that we shouldn't just dismiss it out of hand without deeper consideration.