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I think the author's point is that in a PoW fork, the hash power is a fixed resource and must split between forks. In a PoS fork, prefork holders can stake the

I think the author's point is that in a PoW fork, the hash power is a fixed resource and must split between forks. In a PoS fork, prefork holders can stake the same amount of coins on both forks, thereby "doubling" the total coin being staked. With PoW, the fact that the hash power has to split between forks gives a mechanism for a consensus between forks to be found. With PoS forks, you might as well just continue to stake both forks.

dstaley 5y ago
There's already a solution to this: https://eth.wiki/concepts/proof-of-stake-faqs#what-is-the-nothing-at-stake-problem-and-how-can-it-be-fixed https://eth.wiki/concepts/proof-of-stake-faqs#what-is-the-no...
- gruez 5y ago
  >This can be solved via two strategies. The first, described in broad terms under the name “Slasher” here and developed further by Iddo Bentov here, involves penalizing validators if they simultaneously create blocks on multiple chains, by means of including proof of misbehavior (ie. two conflicting signed block headers) into the blockchain as a later point in time at which point the malfeasant validator’s deposit is deducted appropriately. [...] The second strategy is to simply punish validators for creating blocks on the wrong chain. Which one does ethereum use?
  - dstaley 5y ago
    I believe Casper (Ethereum's PoW protocol) uses the second strategy.
    - deleted 5y ago
      [deleted]
  - deleted 5y ago
    [deleted]
- Dzugaru 5y ago
  > That is, if there are two competing chains, A and B, then if a validator creates a block on B, they get a reward of +R on B, but the block header can be included into A What if it can't (we do ETH 2.342 variant (which doesnt cost us anything contrary to PoW forks) with modified header and later it wins)?
fshbbdssbbgdd 5y ago
On PoW, if one fork is much less popular, it will be feasible to attack because you can rent enough hash power to produce a larger chain. If only slightly less popular, this isn’t feasible. On PoS, a substantially less popular fork will be possible to attack, because you can afford to buy enough coin to stake and take control of the validators. The economic value of your coins will be divided between the forks based on market consensus. A more popular fork will be hard to attack because the coin will be too expensive. In my view these are a similar type of security guarantee, what am I missing? In both PoW and PoS, providing security to prevent attacks requires allocation of economic resources (spending hash power, or holding and staking tokens).
- vineyardmike 5y ago
  In PoW my GPU can only hash one chain at a time so I have to pick a fork to continue on. This is true for everyone else too, so the incentive is to mine the fork that will most likely live since you can’t earn coin without mining. In PoS, I hold tokens and when a fork happens, I’d hold tokens in both forks now (same parent token in both child forks). I can trivially run 2 validators where I stake my tokens in both forks. This is possible because validation in PoS was meant to not consume much resources, so running 2 is affordable. The incentive is to stake both forks because doing so means I’ll pick the right fork (by picking all) and thus preserve my stake in at least one fork.
  - hanniabu 5y ago
    Not all validators will run their node on the fork. As seen with the 2016 fork, many will sell their forked token to buy more of the real thing.
  - fshbbdssbbgdd 5y ago
    I think the punishment system described elsewhere in this thread solves the issue of existing validators running both chains. If that’s correct you’d have to buy more coins to stake to “attack” the cheaper chain (which is much like renting hash power to attack a PoW chain).
DennisP 5y ago
But in practice, hash power isn't used to choose between forks. Nobody says ETC is invalid because it has fewer hashes than ETH. It's still a valid chain, even though it has less market value. The same would be true of PoS: one fork would have more legitimacy and market value than the other. If you're not actually forking, but just operating the protocol normally, PoW chooses between branches just fine, but so does PoS. With Ethereum's version, there's even "finality," which means it's impossible to revert more than a few minutes without destroying a third of the total stake: https://ralexstokes.medium.com/the-finality-gadget-2bf608529e50 https://ralexstokes.medium.com/the-finality-gadget-2bf608529... That's a strict improvement over PoW which only offers a probabilistic guarantee. Both systems can be bypassed by a hard fork, but in both cases the fork will face the same challenge of market value and legitimacy.
- stickfigure 5y ago
  > Nobody says ETC is invalid because it has fewer hashes than ETH. I think you are quite wrong there. At some point the exchanges had to pick which chain was going to get the ETH ticker and which chain was going to get the ETC ticker. While it's hard to say exactly why they did what they did, certainly the amount of hashpower on each chain was a significant factor.
SubiculumCode 5y ago
I would add that some proof of work blockchains are non-forkable e.g. polkadot

dstaley 5y ago

There's already a solution to this: https://eth.wiki/concepts/proof-of-stake-faqs#what-is-the-nothing-at-stake-problem-and-how-can-it-be-fixed https://eth.wiki/concepts/proof-of-stake-faqs#what-is-the-no...

gruez 5y ago
>This can be solved via two strategies. The first, described in broad terms under the name “Slasher” here and developed further by Iddo Bentov here, involves penalizing validators if they simultaneously create blocks on multiple chains, by means of including proof of misbehavior (ie. two conflicting signed block headers) into the blockchain as a later point in time at which point the malfeasant validator’s deposit is deducted appropriately. [...] The second strategy is to simply punish validators for creating blocks on the wrong chain. Which one does ethereum use?
- dstaley 5y ago
  I believe Casper (Ethereum's PoW protocol) uses the second strategy.
  - deleted 5y ago
    [deleted]
- deleted 5y ago
  [deleted]
Dzugaru 5y ago
> That is, if there are two competing chains, A and B, then if a validator creates a block on B, they get a reward of +R on B, but the block header can be included into A What if it can't (we do ETH 2.342 variant (which doesnt cost us anything contrary to PoW forks) with modified header and later it wins)?

fshbbdssbbgdd 5y ago

On PoW, if one fork is much less popular, it will be feasible to attack because you can rent enough hash power to produce a larger chain. If only slightly less popular, this isn’t feasible. On PoS, a substantially less popular fork will be possible to attack, because you can afford to buy enough coin to stake and take control of the validators. The economic value of your coins will be divided between the forks based on market consensus. A more popular fork will be hard to attack because the coin will be too expensive. In my view these are a similar type of security guarantee, what am I missing? In both PoW and PoS, providing security to prevent attacks requires allocation of economic resources (spending hash power, or holding and staking tokens).

vineyardmike 5y ago
In PoW my GPU can only hash one chain at a time so I have to pick a fork to continue on. This is true for everyone else too, so the incentive is to mine the fork that will most likely live since you can’t earn coin without mining. In PoS, I hold tokens and when a fork happens, I’d hold tokens in both forks now (same parent token in both child forks). I can trivially run 2 validators where I stake my tokens in both forks. This is possible because validation in PoS was meant to not consume much resources, so running 2 is affordable. The incentive is to stake both forks because doing so means I’ll pick the right fork (by picking all) and thus preserve my stake in at least one fork.
- hanniabu 5y ago
  Not all validators will run their node on the fork. As seen with the 2016 fork, many will sell their forked token to buy more of the real thing.
- fshbbdssbbgdd 5y ago
  I think the punishment system described elsewhere in this thread solves the issue of existing validators running both chains. If that’s correct you’d have to buy more coins to stake to “attack” the cheaper chain (which is much like renting hash power to attack a PoW chain).

DennisP 5y ago

But in practice, hash power isn't used to choose between forks. Nobody says ETC is invalid because it has fewer hashes than ETH. It's still a valid chain, even though it has less market value. The same would be true of PoS: one fork would have more legitimacy and market value than the other. If you're not actually forking, but just operating the protocol normally, PoW chooses between branches just fine, but so does PoS. With Ethereum's version, there's even "finality," which means it's impossible to revert more than a few minutes without destroying a third of the total stake: https://ralexstokes.medium.com/the-finality-gadget-2bf608529e50 https://ralexstokes.medium.com/the-finality-gadget-2bf608529... That's a strict improvement over PoW which only offers a probabilistic guarantee. Both systems can be bypassed by a hard fork, but in both cases the fork will face the same challenge of market value and legitimacy.

stickfigure 5y ago
> Nobody says ETC is invalid because it has fewer hashes than ETH. I think you are quite wrong there. At some point the exchanges had to pick which chain was going to get the ETH ticker and which chain was going to get the ETC ticker. While it's hard to say exactly why they did what they did, certainly the amount of hashpower on each chain was a significant factor.

SubiculumCode 5y ago

I would add that some proof of work blockchains are non-forkable e.g. polkadot