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The formal method community made a huge mistake using 'proof' as a part of their branding. The SeL4 FAQ has this gem [0]: > Is seL4 proved secure? > This depe
by roenxi 6y ago
The formal method community made a huge mistake using 'proof' as a part of their branding. The SeL4 FAQ has this gem [0]:
> Is seL4 proved secure?
> This depends on what you mean by secure. [answer continues...]
The leadership team would need to be truly inspired to take that sort of thing seriously. It sounds like madness.
[0] https://docs.sel4.systems/projects/sel4/frequently-asked-questions.html https://docs.sel4.systems/projects/sel4/frequently-asked-que...
- saithound 6y ago[answer continues] as you noted, so let's continue that answer: "In the interpretation of classic operating system security, the answer is yes. In particular, seL4 has been proved to enforce specific security properties, namely integrity and confidentiality, under certain assumptions."
- CalChris 6y agoSecurity claims will always depend on a threat model. The question doesn't provide a threat model. So the answer's proviso is appropriate.
- GregarianChild 6y agoThe SeL4 FAQ has this gem I'm struggling to say what's wrong with that claim from a scientific POV. As others also point out, security is conditional on various things, including, in this case, what you consider a valid flow of information and what you don't. For example if an OS allows user-mode to read AES-encrypted kernel-mode data then that would be insecure if you had an unrestricted attacker (who can brute-force AES) but secure assuming polynomial attackers (under standard hardness assumptions for AES). To add insult to injury, we don't in fact know if the standard hardness assumptions actually hold for AES.
- roenxi 6y agoIt is obviously correct from a scientific perspective. Scientific experts probably wrote it.
- GregarianChild 6y agoWhat else would you have used as branding?
- roenxi 6y ago"Guarantee certain properties about the software".