The unstated assumption in conversations about computer security is that the software industry is bad at its job. Incredibly bad at its job. Suggesting that dev

The unstated assumption in conversations about computer security is that the software industry is bad at its job. Incredibly bad at its job. Suggesting that developers write correct code will get you (rightly) laughed out of conversations about security. The problem that solutions like Landlock are trying to solve is "given that this piece of software is going to be compromised, what can we do to mitigate the damage?". Solutions like Landlock (unlike SELinux/AppArmor/Traditional UNIX) make the additional assumption that if the software gets compromised, the compromise will happen after some set point in its execution (such as after it begins processing untrusted data). Once the program is compromised, the attacker controls the program, not the original programmer. This allows them to bypass any checks programmer put in, since those checks were only ever enforced by the program itself. Landlock solves this by moving enforcement outside of the program and into the kernel. Now, once a program has set up its restrictions, it is no longer possible for that program to bypass them (unless the attacker can also find a kernel exploit).