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> Why would you claim that? As long as any CA with its root certificate in your trust store can vouch for any identity, I would argue that TOFU (where you verif
by lmm 6y ago
> Why would you claim that? As long as any CA with its root certificate in your trust store can vouch for any identity, I would argue that TOFU (where you verify the remote resource's key is in control of the identity you intend to connect with) is less prone to having your connection MITM'd, since the attacker would have to either break the underlying cryptography, or exfiltrate the remote's private key.
There are about 170 root CAs, and not all of them are trusted for every domain. There's also things like certificate transparency that make the kind of attack you're talking about much harder. TOFU protects you against a one-off MITM but not against an ongoing attack (and the fact that host keys routinely change for non-attack reasons means many users don't treat a host key mismatch as especially serious).