3 ms·
No. See for example the Grover search algorithm. You can use to find whether an item is inside a list in O(sqrt(n)).
by inasio 5y ago
No. See for example the Grover search algorithm. You can use to find whether an item is inside a list in O(sqrt(n)).
- spxtr 5y agoI don't understand what you are saying. The parent comment said that quantum allows a few types of operations to get faster, and your response was "No," followed by a specific algorithm that is faster. Where do you disagree?
- BobbyJo 5y agoI think the point was it doesn't only speed up a small set of linear algebra calculations, but allows other, more complex, operations to be sped up as well.
- klyrs 5y agoHow big does n need to be before the expected runtime is less than n/2? And at that n, what gate fidelity is necessary to ensure that the answer will usally be correct?
- haecceity 5y agoSlightly tangential but how significant is O(sqrt(n)) speed up? Fast algorithms are slightly faster but intractable algorithms are still intractable?
- eximius 5y agoIt makes memory, not compute, the limit. It halves the exponent on the number of operations. 2^128 - reasonably secure by todays standards! 2^64 - horribly insecure. (CAVEAT: where the speedup is applicable, which is often hard.)
- bawolff 5y ago2^64 is hardly horribly insecure. Its on the edge of what a gigantic compute cluster can do. So its not secure, but hardly horribly insecure. Especially even if you can get a quantum computter working, its not going to be on the same level of operations that a million dollars in AWS credits will get you. At least not for a very long time. Besides,in most places where that is an issue, its trivial to switch to 256bit algorithms > (CAVEAT: where the speedup is applicable, which is often hard.) Grover's algorithm has pretty wide applicability. Its the exponential speed ups like shor's algorithm that have super limited applicability.
- haecceity 5y agoI think the point is it lowers security by a factor of 2 in the exponent. Going from 2^64 to 2^63 lowers the amount of time to bruteforce a key by half.