4 ms·
> The stakers (and their adjoints) can collude and decide to reorg the chain for a different outcome. This can be done indefinitely at no additional cost. No,
by exo762 5y ago
> The stakers (and their adjoints) can collude and decide to reorg the chain for a different outcome. This can be done indefinitely at no additional cost.
No, they can't. As a part of the attack they will have to produce a two different signatures for the same decision (block N has hash X). This is where slashing comes in - anyone can submit those signatures to the chain to slash signers.
- fredfoobar 5y agoSir, this has been discussed extensively whenever it comes up. Who will slash the slashers?? Just THINK about the complexity you're introducing, you're just obfuscating the system more and more to just avoid some loopholes, while not eliminating it either.
- exo762 5y ago> Who will slash the slashers?? Anyone who can produce a block with the proof inside. Attack you are describing depends on attackers having not 51% of the stake, but 100% of the stake. > while not eliminating it either. You would have to show this, not just claim.