it's also sounding kind of like the simplification an IT clueless manager might make after too much coffee and not enough sleep. it whats likely happened was t

it's also sounding kind of like the simplification an IT clueless manager might make after too much coffee and not enough sleep. it whats likely happened was that the hardened industrial control network was pretty much fine meaning that engineers inside of the pumping facilities could manually direct/redirect flow with all the required safeguards still in place, but that they had no plan for where to direct the flow as all information about who needed/ordered what sat in the unhardened corporate network. This is kind of similar to what happens to warehouses and "just in time" factory lines when the order printer/queue ceases up, or is no longer fed data from the back end system, and while one might expect that the operators of critical infrastructure have a plan for minimal services when/if the unhardened corporate network fails but that plan(even if it existed) likely sat on the same unsecured and now encrypted network.