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>But the claim that forward secrecy is unnecessary because STARTTLS protects mail in transist is downright odd. I don't see that connection in the article. The
by upofadown 5y ago
>But the claim that forward secrecy is unnecessary because STARTTLS protects mail in transist is downright odd.
I don't see that connection in the article. There are two independent claims made:
1. That forward secrecy is not very likely to be valuable because people tend to keep their old messages around.
2. That SMTP STARTTLS protects things on the wire making it so that world governments no longer get to record from the network. The linked page also suggests that this would prevent the selective recording of encrypted messages.
- tptacek 5y agoIt is a huge problem that people keep old messages around. It's a strong argument against using any form of encrypted email, for example; email's UX practically demands you keep searchable archives. Far more people have been compromised by stolen message archives than by messages intercepted in flight; like, I think it's not even close, and that stolen archives are the expected M.O. of state actors. That PGP (and its community) lack cryptographic features to support disappearing messages because they've essentially given up on it as a feature is damning.