While I would agree that Windows has had a less-than-stellar security record (as has Unix, for that matter), I don't think an operating system-specific mechanis

While I would agree that Windows has had a less-than-stellar security record (as has Unix, for that matter), I don't think an operating system-specific mechanism is at play for enabling ransomware. The paradigm that all programs run with a set of permissions defined by the identity of executing user is the main fault (i.e. I ran the ransomware and, therefore, the ransomware has access to all files I have access to). That's not unique to Windows. A capabilities-based permission system would help. I'm not convinced that capabilities will limit the damage to file servers, however. I don't see users or IT admins having the capacity to map out access to shared filesystems on a two dimensional matrix of security principals and applications. Most companies can barely pull it off for just security principals. If we move away from file servers the new ransomware will move to attacking whatever the next platform is, co-opting whatever "tokens" define the users' and devices' access to applications. Rate limiting and behavior monitoring are probably our best bets on long-term eradication of ransomware. (That and CoW filesystems becoming the rule, rather than the exception.)