3 ms·
i’ve never tried to walk through the proof myself (i’ve heard it makes some significant leaps, ironically), but understanding the gist of it seems reasonably st
by clairity 5y ago
i’ve never tried to walk through the proof myself (i’ve heard it makes some significant leaps, ironically), but understanding the gist of it seems reasonably straightforward. a simple summary (forget from where this came) is that no self-consistent set of statements is provable true (reflective of reality), and the converse, no provably true set of statements can be provably self-consistent (no unprovable premises allowed). the proof surely has lots of nuance and caveats, but the (apparently debatable) philosophical implication is that logical systems can’t stand on their own and explain the world, which actually seems succinctly consistent with our general lived experience.
- ProfHewitt 5y agoThe proofs in [Gödel 1931] are incorrect for foundational theories because the proposition I'mUnprovable does not exist. It is very fortunate that I'mUnprovable does not exist because otherwise foundational theories would be inconsistent. See the following for an explanation: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3603021 https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3603021