More importantly, if China were to destroy the fabs in the night and withdraw quickly, the US would have no economic incentive to retaliate. We always treat Tai

More importantly, if China were to destroy the fabs in the night and withdraw quickly, the US would have no economic incentive to retaliate. We always treat Taiwan as a tug of war for control of the fabs, but such a fait accompli would totally change the dynamics of the situation. This may not be likely today, but China has been forced to develop its chip industry in parallel for a long time, and they admit as much if you watch their state-sponsored english-language semiconductor media commentary on YouTube. Eventually they will not need Taiwan nearly as much as America does. The only way to sidestep that problem is for the US to do the same as Taiwan: use government power and resources to establish a competitive semiconductor hub in the Americas. Funnily enough, South Korea has done the same in all practical senses. Samsung makes up more of South Korea's GDP in percentage terms than TSMC's share of Taiwan’s GDP. Samsung's trade policy interests are essentially South Korea's trade policy interests.