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I see nothing there that invalidates any of those points. At best it weakens points 1, 4 and 5 on the basis that companies will get away with it by paying ranso
by a1369209993 5y ago
I see nothing there that invalidates any of those points. At best it weakens points 1, 4 and 5 on the basis that companies will get away with it by paying ransoms[0], and ransomers have a incentive to not be so extractive that they kill the hosts they're parasitising, but that's still a idiot tax for said companies.
0: rather than their previous strategy of ignoring the problem entirely because other poeple's privacy doesn't show up on their balance sheet
- meowface 5y agoIndeed, I'd need to explicitly address each point to explain exactly why and how I disagree. They're not exactly wrong in a general sense (which I know sounds a little contradictory given I said "every single point is completely inaccurate, irrelevant, and/or nonsensical"), but I think they're wrong in a fundamental way when talking about the ransomware problem. And point 1 is a total non-sequitur in at least three different ways. It's a complex topic. Basically, I just think that even though a ton of cynicism (about this, about the infosec industry, about companies' approach to security) is absolutely and overwhelmingly warranted, they're being too cynical.
- a1369209993 5y ago> they're being too cynical. Huh? If anything, they're too optimistic; as you pointed out, it's likely many companies will continue to ignore this and either make backups without improving their security, pay ransoms after the fact or quietly implode when they can't. I agree that 1 is a bit useless (although I took it to mean PGP-for-example, not PGP-specifically), but I didn't see anything particularly relevant to it, aside from what I mentioned above.