5 ms·

That's mistaken in two ways. First, the tragedy of the commons - aka the public goods problem - is an argument why a commons can't work, full stop. It's precis

by dash2 5y ago

That's mistaken in two ways. First, the tragedy of the commons - aka the public goods problem - is an argument why a commons can't work, full stop. It's precisely mathematically specified. If the conclusion doesn't hold, that's because the assumptions didn't hold. You can certainly argue that the assumptions don't hold in many places, e.g. among Maine lobster gangs or in the woods around Japanese villages, and indeed that's what various authors have done. They have not argued - and it would make little sense - that a different economic system would magically make public goods games have a different equilibrium. Second, you're mistaken in assuming that actors in successfully maintained commons are economically irrational. One simple interpretation of these commons is that they are repeated games. In such games it is rational to cooperate to preserve the commons, since defection leads to others defecting in future. That is standard economic rationality. Elinor Ostrom put forward that interpretation sometimes. She also emphasized that communities used things like punishments and fines to sanction uncooperative behaviour - again, these mechanisms work for standard homo economicus reasons.

hnbad 5y ago
The economic system is literally part of the assumptions. The tragedy of the commons holds up under laissez-faire capitalism. It can be somewhat mitigated under other forms of capitalism but there are examples for commons that pre-date capitalism itself and also specifically enclosure (the formal privatization of common land), which itself pre-dates capitalism. I'm not sure why you think you need to defend the concept of homo economicus. You're literally refuting your own first point with the second: a commons can work, but where it has worked it has usually come with constraints that run contrary to laissez-faire/free-market capitalism (or the approximation thereof) and that don't necessarily translate to the dynamics between globe-spanning corporations compared to that between a much smaller set of individuals.
- dash2 5y ago
  No, the logic of public goods does not require any assumption about the economic system. Any set of actors whose actions create a negative externality, and who cannot enforce agreements to cooperate (either through the courts or via repeated interactions) will overproduce the externality. So, you could say the assumptions include the legal system. There are numerous tragedies of the commons under socialist economic systems, including environmental degradation and the inefficiency of socialist firms. There are plenty under capitalism too. Berlin under Rhineland capitalism has plenty of litter, just as New York does under Anglo-American capitalism. Hunter-gatherering bands are also perfectly capable of overusing natural resources and failing to cooperate. When they succeed, it's because they get the incentives right - at least, there is a reasonable case for that.[1] I defend homo economicus to dispel a false impression: that successfully sustained commons refute the idea that humans (a) are self-interested and (b) make optimal choices. You could say that laboratory public goods games do that, but even there you'd have to qualify your argument very carefully. [1] Guala, Francesco, 2012. Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate. Behavioral and brain sciences, 35(1), pp.1-15.
  - hnbad 5y ago
    I'm not sure who you think you're arguing with but so far most of your rebuttals attack points I never made. I never said that humans aren't "self-interested" or that humans, in the abstract, can be described as acting optimally within given constraints. I said that the constraints influence behavior (which you agree with) and I said that the current economic system results in a tragedy of commons (which you also agree with). I also said that it is also possible to avoid the tragedy of the commons (at least locally, for a given commons), which is demonstrated by successful commons existing and having existed under different constraints. None of that seems to be anything you disagree with, yet here we are. Note that both examples you've given — rentier capitalism in Berlin and New York, and (presumably) Soviet-style bureaucratic socialism — suffer massively from alienation, which demonstrably leads to inefficiency and disregard (e.g. littering). This is well-understood enough that creating a feeling of "ownership" or "autonomy" (without introducing monetary benefits or democratic sharing of actual control over the company) has become a management strategy to motivate employees under capitalism. As a counter-example to Berlin under capitalism in Germany, consider affluent rural areas where you see barely any littering. These regions however also have a high rate of home ownership and parallel social support networks, which I assume is what you're gesturing at as "repeated interactions" (but in this case often spanning literally generations). But these systems are unstable under laissez-faire capitalism as they present an inefficient resource use in the greater economic system and will over time erode as residents move away for job opportunities and properties are sold off and reused for more space-efficient apartment buildings. To summarize, I'm not saying a tragedy of the commons can not exist under other economic systems, I'm saying there are systems under which a given tragedy of the commons can be averted and that this is not the case for the current one.
    - dash2 5y ago
      OK, fine. But this is also false. There are many tragedies of the commons that are successfully avoided under capitalism. As you point out, affluent rural areas are one, and the claim that in future these are all automatically going to die off is a post-dated cheque. (Villages in the UK stockbrocker belt have little litter, despite being composed of wealthy incomers.) Another example is cartels. In the end, what's left apart from the uninteresting claim that "constraints influence behaviour"?

by dash2 5y ago

hnbad 5y ago

The economic system is literally part of the assumptions. The tragedy of the commons holds up under laissez-faire capitalism. It can be somewhat mitigated under other forms of capitalism but there are examples for commons that pre-date capitalism itself and also specifically enclosure (the formal privatization of common land), which itself pre-dates capitalism. I'm not sure why you think you need to defend the concept of homo economicus. You're literally refuting your own first point with the second: a commons can work, but where it has worked it has usually come with constraints that run contrary to laissez-faire/free-market capitalism (or the approximation thereof) and that don't necessarily translate to the dynamics between globe-spanning corporations compared to that between a much smaller set of individuals.

dash2 5y ago
No, the logic of public goods does not require any assumption about the economic system. Any set of actors whose actions create a negative externality, and who cannot enforce agreements to cooperate (either through the courts or via repeated interactions) will overproduce the externality. So, you could say the assumptions include the legal system. There are numerous tragedies of the commons under socialist economic systems, including environmental degradation and the inefficiency of socialist firms. There are plenty under capitalism too. Berlin under Rhineland capitalism has plenty of litter, just as New York does under Anglo-American capitalism. Hunter-gatherering bands are also perfectly capable of overusing natural resources and failing to cooperate. When they succeed, it's because they get the incentives right - at least, there is a reasonable case for that.[1] I defend homo economicus to dispel a false impression: that successfully sustained commons refute the idea that humans (a) are self-interested and (b) make optimal choices. You could say that laboratory public goods games do that, but even there you'd have to qualify your argument very carefully. [1] Guala, Francesco, 2012. Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate. Behavioral and brain sciences, 35(1), pp.1-15.
- hnbad 5y ago
  I'm not sure who you think you're arguing with but so far most of your rebuttals attack points I never made. I never said that humans aren't "self-interested" or that humans, in the abstract, can be described as acting optimally within given constraints. I said that the constraints influence behavior (which you agree with) and I said that the current economic system results in a tragedy of commons (which you also agree with). I also said that it is also possible to avoid the tragedy of the commons (at least locally, for a given commons), which is demonstrated by successful commons existing and having existed under different constraints. None of that seems to be anything you disagree with, yet here we are. Note that both examples you've given — rentier capitalism in Berlin and New York, and (presumably) Soviet-style bureaucratic socialism — suffer massively from alienation, which demonstrably leads to inefficiency and disregard (e.g. littering). This is well-understood enough that creating a feeling of "ownership" or "autonomy" (without introducing monetary benefits or democratic sharing of actual control over the company) has become a management strategy to motivate employees under capitalism. As a counter-example to Berlin under capitalism in Germany, consider affluent rural areas where you see barely any littering. These regions however also have a high rate of home ownership and parallel social support networks, which I assume is what you're gesturing at as "repeated interactions" (but in this case often spanning literally generations). But these systems are unstable under laissez-faire capitalism as they present an inefficient resource use in the greater economic system and will over time erode as residents move away for job opportunities and properties are sold off and reused for more space-efficient apartment buildings. To summarize, I'm not saying a tragedy of the commons can not exist under other economic systems, I'm saying there are systems under which a given tragedy of the commons can be averted and that this is not the case for the current one.
  - dash2 5y ago
    OK, fine. But this is also false. There are many tragedies of the commons that are successfully avoided under capitalism. As you point out, affluent rural areas are one, and the claim that in future these are all automatically going to die off is a post-dated cheque. (Villages in the UK stockbrocker belt have little litter, despite being composed of wealthy incomers.) Another example is cartels. In the end, what's left apart from the uninteresting claim that "constraints influence behaviour"?