5 ms·
This didn't protect Ross Ulbricht.
by itake 5y ago
This didn't protect Ross Ulbricht.
- encryptluks2 5y agoBecause he walked away from his computer and left it unlocked. Wear a hidden bluetooth device or something to lock your computer and use USBGuard if you're that worried.
- flatiron 5y agoIIRC he was still sitting at the computer. They just distracted him to turn around and then they swiped it.
- encryptluks2 5y agoRegardless, USBGuard and a hidden bluetooth device to automatically lock when it leaves a certain radius would have likely prevented any issues.
- michaelt 5y agoUlbricht was arrested in 2013. USBGuard and usbkill were released in 2015. Tough to do encryptluks2-approved opsec if you have to use tools that don't exist.
- encryptluks2 5y agoUSBGuard is a newer tool, however the functionality has existed through udev or other integrations for some time.
- jandrese 5y agoThey literally snuck up behind him and swiped it out of his hands. He was seated with his back to the door, one of his many opsec failures.
- bawolff 5y agoI feel that, at the point where the fbi is trying to distract you by making out so they could steal your laptop, its already too late and you are very screwed. Maybe a bluetooth autolocking thing could have delayed the inevitable, but it would just be a delay.
- encryptluks2 5y agoNot really. Wish proper encryption and a USB safe list, once the computer is locked there isn't much they can do.
- bawolff 5y agoThey can watch you for the rest of your life, interrogate you, etc. Presumably they acted the way they did because they had reasonable belief that their plan would work. If Ross behaved differently i assume they would have a different plan of action
- brobinson 5y agoNeither did linking his dark web identity to his real life identity via multiple forum posts or his other 1,000 opsec failures.
- xvector 5y agoI suspect those “opsec failures” are just parallel construction. The FBI almost certainly used a zero day on him and then waited to see how they could construct a feasible explanation for having identified him from there.
- hnnnnnnng 5y agoI agree with this. They just wait to find a small breadcrumb trail and then use that construct a case. The identifying the suspect is done through hidden means.
- bawolff 5y agoEven if that's true, Ross certainly made it easy for them
- maybelsyrup 5y ago> almost certainly used a zero day on him I "like" this explanation, but are you going with your gut on that or do you have any concrete signs that point in that direction?
- xvector 5y agoParallel construction is not new for US intelligence when it comes to solving high-profile crime. We know US intelligence both hoards and uses zero days, especially on users of Tor. As such, we can be reasonably certain that parallel construction is used to capture cybercriminals in high-profile cases, since it immensely simplifies solving the crime to a matter of using the exploit and merely observing for gaps in opsec. Furthermore, using a zero-day on Ulbricht would be optimal as he is no security researcher. You are unlikely to “burn” a zero-day unless you are using it in a dragnet sort of fashion while a vigilant security researcher is watching. By definition, it’s hard to find proof of parallel construction. However, former intelligence officials have confirmed its use as a “bedrock technique” for catching criminals [1]. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction
- na85 5y agoArguably it did protect him, but Ulbricht compromised himself by making several major opsec blunders including linking his personal Gmail address to his pseudonyms.
- therein 5y agoTry public WiFi + spoofed MAC + directional antenna. What if you live 3 blocks away from a public library but a few floors higher? With direct line of sight and some wireless networking gear? Would they really try to triangulate the client packets? It is a large leap past "oh he is in the library, let's go find him". You aren't triangulating the AP, you need to logically isolate the packets from the client, calculate their dB and somehow triangulate on just that.
- NaturalPhallacy 5y ago>Would they really try to triangulate the client packets? It is a large leap past "oh he is in the library, let's go find him". This is smart, and a good idea. But it really just adds a step. Once they go to the library and don't find him, they'll start looking for something 'smart'. And doing 'smart' things like this really get the hackles of the feds up because they start thinking exciting things like 'state actor', and "I'll get a promotion out of this". The best place to hide something is right out in the open. Preferably behind a SEP field. Not hating on your idea, just exploring it further.