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It's interesting to consider the human link between the admin systems and industrial control systems here. If we assume the controls are on an airgapped network
by bradstewart 5y ago
It's interesting to consider the human link between the admin systems and industrial control systems here. If we assume the controls are on an airgapped network, the attackers, in some sense, jumped the airgap and shutdown the pipeline.
Obviously not as bad as an actual compromise of the control systems though, which presumably could cause leaks, explosions, etc.
- rckoepke 5y agoGenerally the controls are firewalled from the administrative/business systems, not air-gapped. Production data (like gallons per minute of flow through the pipeline) must be sent from the controls to the business analytics software. That's generally done through a firewall over TCP/IP.
- DrPhish 5y agoOften that kind of reporting data is delivered back via a “data diode” unidirectional network. That said, there is usually just a dmz between biz and prod to enable remote support of the controls system (ala the Purdue model), and not any real air gap.
- mysterydip 5y agoI've seen systems where data is sent via UDP and the physical connection was transmit-only (for example, only the transmit fiber plugged in to the port) to avoid potential firewall exploitation.
- daniellarusso 5y ago…and the controls still have internet access, but it is NAT’ed, and it still has a fresh copy of Internet Explorer 9. I have only witnessed this once, at a wastewater treatment plant, so very anecdotal.
- frombody 5y agoI've worked on these systems, they are separate. They likely could have kept running the pipeline without incident. I imagine when the government stepped in they decided to dial their procedures up to 10 and they plan on making an example out of this incident and the perpetrators.