3 ms·
I've gone completely off biometric security. It's unchangeable and externally facing. The only truly secure enclave is the things in my head, and they have the
by XorNot 6y ago
I've gone completely off biometric security.
It's unchangeable and externally facing. The only truly secure enclave is the things in my head, and they have the benefit of being changeable if compromised, and I can make a positive distinction of value if under duress.
- bostik 6y agoAs you should. They are amputationware. [Snark warning!] "We were compromised. Rotate your passwords, chop off your finger and change your face." [End snark] Biometric measurements are fuzzy, by their nature. This in turn means that for every stored biometric identifier, there is a whole range of inputs / input signals that will match. On top of that, the measurement devices are on untrusted systems. If you can compromise the device and extract the signal sent from the sensor, you should have a near universal replay payload. Right now that is still an espionage realm threat, but as these methods become more universal, mass attacks against large populations become more and more appealing. Archives of valid (username, password) tuples are already sold on underground markets. It's not much of a stretch to predict that (username, biometric sensor dump) archives will eventually become a commodity too.
- someguyorother 6y ago>If you can compromise the device and extract the signal sent from the sensor, you should have a near universal replay payload. Right now that is still an espionage realm threat, but as these methods become more universal, mass attacks against large populations become more and more appealing. If the manufacturers had a sense of security, they would make the sensor into a hard-wired device that takes an auxiliary value as input and combines the input with a fuzzy extractor to provide a unique key per auxiliary value in such a way that neither the value nor the biometric can be extracted from the key. But I'm not holding my breath!