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Everyone who was affected by the bug was notified by email, and Dropbox's CEO even gave them his phone number so that they could contact him. As I see it, that'
by sorbus 15y ago
Everyone who was affected by the bug was notified by email, and Dropbox's CEO even gave them his phone number so that they could contact him. As I see it, that's the proper response to issues like this: informing everyone who was affected, and not panicking all the unaffected users.
- thirsteh 15y agoI don't believe they can pinpoint "the affected users" (supposedly below 100) with such accuracy. It's not responsible to assume nobody else logged in from another location just because only one person logged into 100+ accounts. It would have been easy to announce without panicking the existing users. By not announcing it at all, and trying to stay below the radar, you incite everyone who's unaffected and reads the news--or, at least, they did me. It's a cheap business move, not "the integrity of your data is our first priority".
- sorbus 15y agoThis happened on a sunday originally, right? Hence a small number of users logging in to the website. Pinpointing affected users could be as simple as finding the small number of accounts which were logged into from new IP addresses. Alternatively, perhaps the auth server was logging failed attempts, even though the bug resulted in failed attempts being treated as successful attempts. That would make it ridiculously trivial to find all of the accounts compromised - any account accessed with an incorrect password from a new IP address. The number of attackers doesn't matter. Admittedly, I don't work for Dropbox, and am not aware of the details of how they identifying affected users. I'm just pointing out that it would be very easy to identify affected users with high accuracy and almost no chance of false negatives.
- thirsteh 15y agoWhat is your definition of small? You don't think there were MANY accounts that logged in from new locations in that time frame? Think wireless networks... I simply refuse to believe that with such a gigantic service they could determine that only X and Y were compromised by "one person" so accurately and so quickly--especially considering they haven't even implemented a build/deploy-time test suite that, among many other things, asserts that something like the auth system works actually works. Your suggestion is pure speculation like you say, and, really, any application that logs something like "invalid auth" usually(!) immediately aborts the session (since that's the logical thing to do); it doesn't continue it...