2 ms·
> but if you're BCC'ing two different organizations where a dangerous situation would result from one of those organizations knows that the other received it, t
by ajross 6y ago
> but if you're BCC'ing two different organizations where a dangerous situation would result from one of those organizations knows that the other received it, then you've already made a bad decision
I don't know that I buy that. The easiest way to get around a security critique is to respond "but this isn't a security problem", which is fundamentally what you and MS are doing.
The problem with that logic is that most security problems (and all the interesting ones!) don't look like security problems until they become so. Maybe people are too young to remember, but XSS and SQL injection were genuine surprises at one point, being vulnerabilities in a part of a system that no one thought was subject to "security" issues. This has the same smell.
The more justifiable response here is to recognize that RFC822 long ago made an interface promise that at least "looks like" a privacy thing: BCC copies are blind. And software that violates that promise should be presumptively insecure, not excused away because other areas of the system may be equally insecure (or, worse, because the practical impact seems low).
Shorter version: BCC clearly should be private because its users expect it to be private, and no other reason should be required.