4 ms·
what should this be made with
by VWWHFSfQ 6y ago
what should this be made with
- deathanatos 6y agoWhy Rust of course! /s More seriously, as much as I'm personally not a huge fan of JS (but this is TypeScript?) I don't see how such comments add to the conversation. This particular package even seems to be very considerate with its dependencies: there's only a half dozen, and relate to obvious things like terminal coloring/manipulation, syntax highlighting, and diff generation… Now, I've not explored the full tree to see if those drag in the world, of course. Sometimes, I think the hate on dependency trees gives them a bad rap. Code reuse lets people build things easily & quickly without having to badly reinvent every wheel! Sometimes, I get notified of a JS dependency with a security vulnerability where if a user can control how many spaces are used for indentation in some library's pretty-printer they can RCE and I die a little inside. I think there are easier ways to get a side-by-side diff, but this tool does do a remarkable job of reproducing GitHub's aesthetics.
- inshadows 6y agoIt's not about language nor dependency tree per se. It's about what is in that dependency tree. When I depend on a library A in say Python I can be reasonably sure that it won't download and execute random shit from Internet, nor that it will pull tons of other crap to log to console in colorful ANSI boxes. Basically, it's about NPM ecosystem, which is anything but trustworthy to be run as a terminal application. EDIT: Anyway, didn't mean to shit on author's work. (S)he apparently put fair amount of work into it, and the result looks great.
- meowface 6y agoThis is illusory safety. The exact same risks are present in PyPI. There've been plenty of notorious malicious PyPI package incidents and there will be plenty more. If there are dependencies, there could be security risks. JavaScript and NPM just have higher market share, so that's where attackers are more likely to focus their efforts. This is akin to all the people who used to say Macs aren't or can't be infected with malware. What you could do is just audit the package list and try to make a reasonable decision. 35 different packages for a small script, some with almost no GitHub stars or downloads? Maybe cause for concern. A few well-known libraries? Probably less concerning. You'd need to audit the entire lock file to really be sure, but this gives you some idea, at least. It's true that JS developers generally seem to tend towards using a larger number of smaller libraries on average, so it's possible the risk is a bit higher both due to that and the market share, and maybe a few other reasons, but it's not like there are any fundamental differences here. Each project will have their own way of handling dependencies, regardless of the language. You have to evaluate individual projects in any language on a case-by-case basis, and not just stereotype based on the language used. If your comment instead was ripping on the actual contents of package.json (or requirements.txt etc.), then you'd quite possibly have a valid point, but balking at the mere existence of the file is pretty ridiculous.
- bassdropvroom 6y agoI think a big problem with the node ecosystem is the lack of standard library. When I'm developing on PHP, Python, or go, they have a vast standard library that means the likelihood of me using a third-party package is relatively low for the most mundane stuff. Comparing that to node, and you'll need to use an npm package for just about anything. This automatically gives you a much larger attack surface. If I understand correctly Deno is supposed to address that, but I have yet to play with it, so not sure how it works.
- meowface 6y agoDefinitely a valid counter-point. I'm sure for that and several other reasons, the Node package ecosystem is probably indeed the riskiest of the set. But it's still really foolish for the parent just immediately turn their nose in disgust simply at the sight of a package.json file. Or to say "When I depend on a library A in say Python I can be reasonably sure that it won't download and execute random shit from Internet", which is just completely untrue and misguided in a lot of ways. It's absolutely just as easy for anyone to backdoor a Python package as it is to backdoor an NPM package, and it happens all the time. It's possible it could happen a lot more frequently in the future, too. You could argue that statement's true in a sense, but given that same sense it's also true of Node; it's not a good way of thinking about dependency supply chain attacks.
- inshadows 6y agoYou totally misunderstood my point. I wasn't talking about backdoors or supply chain attacks. When I say that a dependency downloads and executes random shit from Internet I meant it as a behavior intended to fulfill its function. The problem is that this is generally acceptable in nodejs/NPM ecosystem. In other words, the gap in dependency hygiene between nodejs/NPM and other ecosystems is huge, and users of it seems not to bother.
- meowface 6y ago>When I say that a dependency downloads and executes random shit from Internet I meant it as a behavior intended to fulfill its function. Can you give an example? I'm aware of the banner thing, but I think that was only a few projects, and that's something else entirely.