4 ms·
The fix is simple, don't allow access to clocks or timing information in anything other than the microkernel that runs the OS.
by mikewarot 6y ago
The fix is simple, don't allow access to clocks or timing information in anything other than the microkernel that runs the OS.
- jeffbee 6y agoThat would break so many things.
- mikewarot 6y agoProper multi-level security doesn't allow access to the clock in anything other than the top level. You could just have a monotonically counter that is periodically synced to reality every minute or two.
- jeffbee 6y agoI must be misunderstanding what you are suggesting, since what it seems like you are suggesting would never work. High-resolution timing information is available to user applications via numerous APIs today. Hyrum's Law, and common sense, tell us we can't just lose this feature of operating systems and expect applications to work.
- titzer 6y agoYou can construct a high resolution timer from shared mutable memory and multiple threads. It's simple. One thread increments a counter, and the other thread reads it.
- xucheng 6y agoYou don't need OS to build a very precise clock for the purpose of exploiting timing attack. That's why SharedArrayBuffer[1] is disabled in all browsers. Moreover, not every side channel attack relies on timing attack. For interested readers, there is a paper titled "Fantastic Timers and Where to Find Them: High-Resolution Microarchitectural Attacks in JavaScript", which discussed a variety of ways to build high resolution clocks. [1]: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/177033/how-can-sharedarraybuffer-be-used-for-timing-attacks https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/177033/how-can-...
- titzer 6y agoSharedArrayBuffer is not disabled in all browsers. It was briefly disabled at disclosure time of the first Spectre vulnerabilities, but as browsers moved to site isolation (one process per origin), they have reenabled it.