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You verify it with TLS. But then that raises the question of why you need crypto if everything is already encrypted and verified via TLS. There are probably a
by bawolff 6y ago
You verify it with TLS.
But then that raises the question of why you need crypto if everything is already encrypted and verified via TLS.
There are probably a couple obscure unique usecases (maybe if you're doing some p2p stuff with webrtc), but i'm pretty convinced client side crypto on the web is useless 99% of the time.
- harporoeder 6y agoClient side encryption is still useful for webapps (or even proprietary apps) for example in apps like protonmail. At any time the company could send a payload that would extract the keys and pwn a user. But what it does provide is the guarantee that if they start non malicious, but later become malicious the scope of their capabilities are limited. If you don't log in to some historical account there is nothing they can do the attack has to be active. Similarly continuing on the example plaintext emails are encrypted when they are received by them and stored with your key. You could argue "well they could just not encrypt them". But any emails that they did encrypt while not malicious are still outside of their power if they change.
- bronco21016 6y agoBitwarden, and all web based password manager clients, rely on client side crypto for ensuring the data is not viewable by the service provider. I'd argue that I would like to see more client-side crypto. I'd prefer my data to be stored encrypted and inaccessible to third parties such as Google. Google Drive or Dropbox would get my business back instantly if they supported client-side encryption of data. Of course, in Google's case, that would completely break the business model of mining us for every ounce of data.
- dspillett 6y ago> But then that raises the question of why you need crypto if everything is already encrypted and verified via TLS. Depends where the TLS path terminates and what your threat model is. If I send a message via a service (an email via gmail.com for instance) the message is only protected by TLS as far as that provider. If the content itself is encrypted as well as the transport (and that provider does not know the keys) then the message is still protected at that point. This could be important for code sending data via an API proxy of some sort. Also remember that the user of the browser might not have control over what certificates are trusted for HTTPS purposes. If they are operating in an environment where a local CA certificate is installed and that is used by a transparent proxy to enable them to inspect otherwise secure streams, the application protecting the content as well as the transport may protect against that (though you'll be wanting to use PKI here - otherwise you have a key distribution problem).