> In theory you can have an account where both you and your bank must sign a transaction to move funds. This adds an additional layer of security. The bank can'

> In theory you can have an account where both you and your bank must sign a transaction to move funds. This adds an additional layer of security. The bank can't steal your funds without your digital signature and you can't do something stupid without the bank's approval. This is basically the model of Casa, except they're never custodian because they only hold 1-of-N signing keys, where N is 3 or 5, and creating a transaction requires a quorum. The advantage is some redundancy in your signing device setup, and also protection against theft by geographically distributing your keys, while still maintaining sovereignty of your funds. It also allows them to assist you in recovering access to your funds if one of your own signing keys is lost, but they never have the ability to move your funds on their own. The tradeoff compared with maintaining your own multisig setup is a reduction in privacy, since they can see your transaction history. This is still far more preferable than letting a custodian hold "your money" for you. I believe it's the best model for the vast majority of the public to hold Bitcoin. They also push a "seedless" model to prevent the exact attack described in the article. Nothing prevents the user from keeping backups of one (or more) of your seed phrases, it's merely a suggestion. https://keys.casa https://keys.casa disclosure: I used to work at Casa and hold a tiny bit of equity, and I continue to be a satisfied customer