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Assume a case like TrueCrypt's hidden volumes, where multiple keys decrypt different content. Could you use the key to decrypt the fake content, and then when a
by cookiecaper 15y ago
Assume a case like TrueCrypt's hidden volumes, where multiple keys decrypt different content. Could you use the key to decrypt the fake content, and then when asked if that key was the "real key", refuse to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds?
- darklajid 15y agoThat's the whole point of this feature as far as I can tell: It should be impossible (ignoring flaws in the software/system) to know if there's a hidden volume. You give the key to the decoy, smile and ask if you can comply in any other way and move along. The english phrase that I see connected to this all the time seems to be plausible deniability [1]? Since hidden volumes are an optional feature and - again, in theory - cannot be proven to exist, you can always claim that this is the only password. Even if the judge/attorney knows a thing or two about true crypt. 1: https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Plausible_deniability https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Plausible_den...
- cabalamat 15y agoAIUI TrueCrypt has one hidden volume for every real volume, so it's reasonable for law enforcement to ask for the hidden volume if there's a real one. But what if there was a hard disk encryption system that allowed a large number of hidden volumes (say 1000), and a suspect provided police with keys for 5 of them -- how would the police know that there was any more? I think that this would give more effective plausible deniability.
- greiskul 15y agoJulian Assange has worked on a filesystem that does precisely that: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_(file_system) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_(file_system)