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FOSS won't help you very much unless you're willing to build your entire tool chain from vetted source. http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761

• vkou 6y ago
  That's like saying that seatbelts don't help very much, unless you're willing to wear a motorcycling helmet, and install a roll cage in your car. In the worst-case scenario, no, your seatbelt won't help. I'm still going to wear one.
  • lisper 6y ago
    The difference is that the interior of your car is not typically an adversarial environment.
    • brewdad 6y ago
      The exact moment that you need a seatbelt is the same moment your car's interior becomes an adversarial environment.
      • dllthomas 6y ago
        "Adversarial" in this sense is meaningfully different than "dangerous" - at no point is your car trying to outsmart you.
        • jfrunyon 6y ago
          You're right, the car isn't trying to outsmart anyone - physics is trying to outsmart engineers.
          • dllthomas 6y ago
            Nah, physics doesn't need to try :D
    • ce4 6y ago
      That really depends on your threat model. Every effort to reduce your attack surface increases the effort needed for your adveraries. Your "won't help very much" is only true for the trusting trust problems in the paper, i.e. if you need to survive state sponsored attacks
• dllthomas 6y ago
  Trusting Trust actually says that vetted source isn't enough! Fortunately it's been defeated (https://dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/ https://dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/), such that vetted source and multiple compiler executables that are unlikely to be compromised in the same way can be enough if you use them carefully (which, to my knowledge, we don't).