13 ms·

Backdoored password manager stole data from as many as 29K enterprises

178 points by vanburen 5y ago

1cvmask 5y ago
Just to clarify the title. It was not a deliberate backdoor on the part of Passwordstate. It was a supply chain attack. There is some history to their security holes (most of the known ones being patched). https://twitter.com/juanandres_gs/status/1385689464329187329 https://twitter.com/juanandres_gs/status/1385689464329187329 https://github.com/NorthwaveSecurity/passwordstate-decryptor/blob/master/MORE_INFO.md https://github.com/NorthwaveSecurity/passwordstate-decryptor... A potential issue in the password management space is that Francisco Partners (owner of NSO Group) owns Lastpass (and LogMeIn). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSO_Group https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSO_Group https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/08/31/2086214/0/en/Francisco-Partners-and-Evergreen-Coast-Capital-Complete-Acquisition-of-LogMeIn.html https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/08/31/208621... Note: I work in the IAM and PAM space and designed dashboards for saas pass.
- miohtama 5y ago
  Password managers seem to be the most critical software where open source and reproducible builds are needed. Are there any good FOSS password managers that can do remote sync and team permissions?
  - lisper 5y ago
    FOSS won't help you very much unless you're willing to build your entire tool chain from vetted source. http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thompson.pdf http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thom...
    - vkou 5y ago
      That's like saying that seatbelts don't help very much, unless you're willing to wear a motorcycling helmet, and install a roll cage in your car. In the worst-case scenario, no, your seatbelt won't help. I'm still going to wear one.
      - lisper 5y ago
        The difference is that the interior of your car is not typically an adversarial environment.
        brewdad 5y ago
        The exact moment that you need a seatbelt is the same moment your car's interior becomes an adversarial environment.
        dllthomas 5y ago
        "Adversarial" in this sense is meaningfully different than "dangerous" - at no point is your car trying to outsmart you.
        jfrunyon 5y ago
        You're right, the car isn't trying to outsmart anyone - physics is trying to outsmart engineers.
        dllthomas 5y ago
        Nah, physics doesn't need to try :D
        ce4 5y ago
        That really depends on your threat model. Every effort to reduce your attack surface increases the effort needed for your adveraries. Your "won't help very much" is only true for the trusting trust problems in the paper, i.e. if you need to survive state sponsored attacks
    - dllthomas 5y ago
      Trusting Trust actually says that vetted source isn't enough! Fortunately it's been defeated (https://dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/ https://dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/), such that vetted source and multiple compiler executables that are unlikely to be compromised in the same way can be enough if you use them carefully (which, to my knowledge, we don't).
  - g_p 5y ago
    Bitwarden seems to tick the boxes you need - FOSS license, syncs via an (open source) server which you can host yourself, or use their hosted version, and there's team versions available. It's pretty good. There's also bitwarden_rs (a rust-based server component) if you fancy a simpler self-hosting stack that doesn't require SQL server. The solution has been audited, I believe, but audits are only valid at individual points in time. The only downside for me is the use of electron and web technologies in many of the clients - that for me is a huge attack surface of complexity that few people can fully understand and manage.
    - serial_dev 5y ago
      The mobile clients are written in Xamarin https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile
    - antaviana 5y ago
      Bitwarden says they are hashed and encrypted with your email and master key before leaving your device so it is not possible to get them even if they are ever hacked. So far so good, but how do they protect from hacking or from Bitwarden employees the shared secrets in an organization? I understand that each member of the organization team has their own master key.
      - ivanhoe 5y ago
        > Bitwarden says they are hashed and encrypted with your email and master key before leaving your device so it is not possible to get them even if they are ever hacked. This part makes electron apps even a bigger problem, because if hacker owns the app that's the point where they can grab the password before it's encrypted.
    - laurowyn 5y ago
      Any idea why Bitwarden insist on their installation ID generation for self hosted deployments? it strikes me as unusual, as it's not documented WHY it's necessary, or what the ID is used for, only that you're required to give Bitwarden your email address to get the necessary ID. If they would remove this step, or at the very least explain it, I'd be more likely to deploy and use it. Critical things like password managers should be self hosted where possible, IMO, and this is a blocker preventing trivial deployments.
  - edoceo 5y ago
    this https://www.passwordstore.org/ https://www.passwordstore.org/ its "just" a wrapper around gpg and git. so add/crypt with the team and push. and you can do team shared keys if that's your thing. oh, and passbolt is not terrible either.
  - Jedd 5y ago
    > Are there any good FOSS password managers that can do remote sync and team permissions? Depending on what remote sync and team permissions looks like at your end, you could perhaps get there with KeePassXC [0] (password manager) and a separate sync tool (that did your sync and, effectively, your permissions management) such as Keybase KBFS [1] or SyncThing [2]. [0] https://keepassxc.org/ https://keepassxc.org/ [1] https://book.keybase.io/docs/files https://book.keybase.io/docs/files [2] https://syncthing.net/ https://syncthing.net/
  - timpattinson 5y ago
    I use KeePass + dropbox. Works on windows and android. I'm pretty sure you don't need to trust the syncing software, so anything should work. Someone please correct me if i'm wrong
    - rocqua 5y ago
      Syncing software could perhaps do so cyphertext malleability attacks. Changing the ciphertext, and deducing information on the plaintext based on client behavior. Perhaps they could force you into a password reset for a specific site by corrupting the correct files. That might be an interesting first step for an account takeover. These are highly complicated, active attacks. I wouldn't worry as long as your sync service isn't literally the Russian or Chinese government.
      - jfrunyon 5y ago
        > Perhaps they could force you into a password reset for a specific site by corrupting the correct files. That might be an interesting first step for an account takeover. It would be interesting to see that accomplished without making it obvious (particularly: without corrupting large parts of or the entire database). KeePass encrypts the whole database.
  - lrvick 5y ago
    I use Password Store for these use cases and with yubikey tap-to+decrypt which makes bulk exfiltration of passwords virtually impossible.
- bigsparky 5y ago
  According to Wikipedia Francisco group sold out of NSO in 2019, is that correct?
schlotzisk 5y ago
The post is linking to the comment section of the article. Can you strip the URL of the query string?
- 1cvmask 5y ago
  I think Dang is the only one who can do that once a story is published. You can edit the title but not the url after publishing it.
627467 5y ago
Why would any "enterprise" customers trust closed sourced AND small-time password manager?
- boomboomsubban 5y ago
  Because they quoted the lowest price for support.
- g_p 5y ago
  It seems to me there's a trend around "enterprise" software having weaker supply chains than the more nimble and agile tools. Perhaps mindset related? Larger teams needed to meet enterprise needs? Or simply more focus on the sales machine to close complex enterprise deals, and less focus on securing the pipeline through which the product is made? Solarwinds is a great example of this - "big enterprise software" used by big enterprises, and yet their whole build infrastructure was compromised as it ran with less security thinking than your average open source project (which at least discards build environments each run).
  - kristov 5y ago
    > It seems to me there's a trend around "enterprise" software having weaker supply chains than the more nimble and agile tools. Or enterprise tools are a more attractive target for attacks. Due to that they should be better at this, so still shame on the slack ones.
  - swiley 5y ago
    IME enterprise software is chosen very poorly in general. Microsoft wouldn't be nearly as large now if it weren't for this.
- gerdesj 5y ago
  You does your risk assessment etc etc. For some those are not a combinatorial red flag - for you it seems they are. There are a lot of things to consider and not one of us here can possibly say they've got it all covered. No one ... ever 8) This morning my home doorbell didn't ring and a phone alarm didn't wake someone up. Two almost unrelated fails. As a result we missed an appointment which we fixed an hour or so later. Right let's do the analysis: Doorbell is a Doorbird. I've got it running on a ethernet connection via PoE. All my home IT stuff is on UPS. I have a decent router that I know very well. I don't skimp on my home gear and I have a quite large VMware esxi which runs my home servers and stuff. I use Home Assistant which has a Doorbird integration and when you press my doorbell all my Sonos speakers say: "Ding dong, there is someone at the door". I got it wrong: I thought that my HA box spoke directly to my Doorbird or vv. No it doesn't - it is all done via their API and that means internets. Today I wired up a simple door chime to my Doorbird which will ring regardless of internets. The chime cost £10. The Doorbird has a chime output which isn't latching but good enough to make a chime ... chime. So that's what I do at home.
shravan20 5y ago
a trend, ain't it?
tediousdemise 5y ago
The best password manager is your own salting algorithm and memory.
- cj 5y ago
  > your own salting algorithm This can be an OK strategy as long as your salting algorithm is not easy enough to figure out by looking at a few password breaches that you (now or in the future) are exposed by. It can work if you’re smart about the algorithm, but if someone can guess your algorithm by looking at a few leaked passwords, it can provide a false sense of security.
  - tediousdemise 5y ago
    That’s a thoughtful consideration. My logic is that a personal salting algorithm could be compromised after several points of failure, whereas a password manager can be compromised by a single point of failure. The former requires trust in myself to create a strong algorithm, and the latter requires trust in a black box.
    - scrollaway 5y ago
      It doesn't have to be a black box. There are open source password managers. Bitwarden and Keepassxc are two very good ones. And keep in mind that even if you can create a reasonably strong algorithm which will both be memorable and resistant to reverse engineering, most people won't. Password managers aren't just good for professionals, they're leagues ahead of anything "mere mortals" use. My mom uses 1password -- that's not a slight, I mean that literally; I put her on my family plan.
      - tediousdemise 5y ago
        I’m in support of password managers if they promote better security hygiene for the average user. Particularly, preventing the most heinous of all password crimes: reuse.
      - 5y ago
cillian64 5y ago
Passwordstate doesn’t seem to have automatic update and the update process is mildly annoying, so I can’t imagine very many people were unlucky enough to update during the couple of days they were compromised. Not saying this isn’t very concerning from Click Studios, just that the number is going to be a lot smaller than 29,000.
lmilcin 5y ago
That's why I don't use password managers. That's giving one entity too much power over everything I own.
- StavrosK 5y ago
  Do you simply remember hundreds of random passwords?
  - w4rh4wk5 5y ago
    Just note them down in a book? I know, it sounds stupid, but nowadays it's a lot easier to keep a small booklet save than a digital file on a connected machine.
    - lmilcin 5y ago
      No, it is not stupid. It is strange how people get blinded by technology and forget about oldest, most reliable methods. I have worked as a security officer at a credit card acquirer (basically, processing credit card transactions between terminal and the bank). The process to safeguard your PINs is extremely complex but at the very end relies on pieces of paper with passwords and key components written down, put in tamper evident envelopes and then into safes.
      - jniedrauer 5y ago
        You're describing backups. The base derivation keys still have to exist in an HSM to be used. No one is opening a safe and hand-typing the BDK each time they need to issue a PIN encryption key.
        lmilcin 5y ago
        It is not a backup. Backups are made just in case. In case of HSM keys, the HSM itself is built to loose those keys at the least pretense. It is also not possible to retrieve the keys. So whenever you want to provision a new HSM or even just move it couple centimeters (it looses keys when you try to move it) you have to go to the components written on paper. It is just like a password on a website -- you have to be entering it regularly. But once you enter the password you don't need to retype it for every HTTP request. Key components = password HSM = browser Message with PIN block = HTTP request
cryptica 5y ago
That's why I never used and will never use a password manager... You can't get more security by trusting more intermediaries with your passwords. When it comes to anything that matters, you want to trust as few intermediaries as possible. The more entities have access to your passwords, the less secure you are. I can't believe I even have to say it, it seems so obvious. Why not just remember your passwords? There is an infinite number of strategies and secret rules which you can use to easily remember your passwords. Or for low-importance services, why not just use your browser's built-in password manager? You have to trust the browser maker anyway.
- scrollaway 5y ago
  If you think the concept doesn't make sense, consider that you do not understand it. Highly respected people whose entire careers is security will disagree with you. I'm not telling you to take an argument for authority, but maybe do some introspection about who is more likely to be correct there... Edit: Parent comment edited out some really outrageous claims, so my reply no longer makes as much sense.
  - cryptica 5y ago
    Of course security folks who stand to profit from selling these password management solutions will insist that these solutions are important... After all, like you say, their whole career depends on selling 'security products' to companies and individuals. This kind of argument would never stand up in court because of conflict of interests. About the edit, the meaning of my comment hasn't changed. I just removed the phrase "the concept doesn't make any sense" and expanded it to explain why it doesn't make any sense... It's dishonest to say that I've made an outrageous claim or changed the meaning of the comment in any way. But it's good that expanding my reasoning has led you to reconsider the validity of your argument.
    - scrollaway 5y ago
      > But it's good that expanding my reasoning has led you to reconsider the validity of your argument. What I meant is that my first sentence, which references something you removed from your original comment, sounds very out of context now. And no, none of the folks I'm thinking of actually make money from password management solutions. Your comment sounds the same as "of course all those doctors would recommend getting vaccinated since they make a profit from selling you the vaccines". Please, just stop.
cryptica 5y ago
These days I generally don't trust any security product. They are as much malware themselves as the malware which they claim to protect you from. - Many security software providers are hackers or ex-hackers... So you're basically paying hackers to protect you from themselves. Why should I trust software which is almost 100% guaranteed to have been written by hackers more than any other random software I might download from the internet which has maybe a less than 1% chance of having been written by a hacker? - The software security industry is more about selling security products than actually helping to keep people and companies secure. The incentives are to sell peace of mind while keeping systems vulnerable (don't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs). - Most security products capitalize on fear rather than genuine threats (security tools tend to show lots of false positives to draw attention to themselves or to upsell additional software).
- scrollaway 5y ago
  There's a distinction between "protection" security software such as antiviruses and VPNs which indeed is an industry filled with scams and conmen, and utility security software such as password managers. Most of the big name password managers are very good. The only one I'd recommend avoiding is lastpass, and even so they're not that bad, just strictly worse than the others. Emphasis on big name. 1Password, Bitwarden, keepassx(c), and whatever microsoft's was called.
- jfrunyon 5y ago
  > Many security software providers are hackers or ex-hackers... So you're basically paying hackers to protect you from themselves. Why should I trust software which is almost 100% guaranteed to have been written by hackers more than any other random software I might download from the internet which has maybe a less than 1% chance of having been written by a hacker? Because the hackers know how other hackers are going to try to break it. Most developers pay literally no attention to the security of their code.
afpx 5y ago
My password manager: a mental hash of some site attributes, my username, and a security level that results in a valid password. A particularly-motivated attacker could easily reverse engineer my hash algorithm, given enough samples. But, good enough for me.
- yjftsjthsd-h 5y ago
  That's fine until the first time you have to rotate a password, at which point it devolves to, at best, a mnemonic device.
  - eeegnu 5y ago
    At that point add a 2 to the end or change your username. Worst case you have to try a few times to get in, but eventually you'll remember it's one of those sites that uses the extra version information.
    - Fethbita 5y ago
      I don't think just appending a character to your password is such a good idea if it is compromised.
      - megous 5y ago
        As a side note, trying various passwords doesn't strike me as a great idea either. You're basically telling the site you're trying to log into your other passwords you use, along with a username. At the very least you're revealing something about how you derive your passwords, if you have some scheme. I'd say that if I'm not sure about the right password, it's safest to go straight for a password reset function, instead of giving all my passwords or a password derivation method to some random website.
    - yjftsjthsd-h 5y ago
      Right, at which point you now have to remember what iteration you're on (mnemonic device), or iterate versions on every login (IMO worse).
nprateem 5y ago
I run Keepassxc in a VM with no networking enabled, and no networking stack enabled in the VM. The clipboard is shared 2-way with the host. I keep the DB on a shared volume so it can be backed up by the host machine.
crispyambulance 5y ago
Nothing is ever perfect. Password managers are good thing and vastly more pragmatic than the folksy homemade "nuclear-launch-code" alternatives some HN'ers describe here. Sticking with my password manager.
_wldu 5y ago
Related: https://www.go350.com/posts/the-design-flaws-of-password-managers/ https://www.go350.com/posts/the-design-flaws-of-password-man...

178 points by vanburen 5y ago

Just to clarify the title. It was not a deliberate backdoor on the part of Passwordstate. It was a supply chain attack. There is some history to their security holes (most of the known ones being patched). https://twitter.com/juanandres_gs/status/1385689464329187329 https://twitter.com/juanandres_gs/status/1385689464329187329 https://github.com/NorthwaveSecurity/passwordstate-decryptor/blob/master/MORE_INFO.md https://github.com/NorthwaveSecurity/passwordstate-decryptor... A potential issue in the password management space is that Francisco Partners (owner of NSO Group) owns Lastpass (and LogMeIn). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSO_Group https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSO_Group https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/08/31/2086214/0/en/Francisco-Partners-and-Evergreen-Coast-Capital-Complete-Acquisition-of-LogMeIn.html https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/08/31/208621... Note: I work in the IAM and PAM space and designed dashboards for saas pass.

miohtama 5y ago
Password managers seem to be the most critical software where open source and reproducible builds are needed. Are there any good FOSS password managers that can do remote sync and team permissions?
- lisper 5y ago
  FOSS won't help you very much unless you're willing to build your entire tool chain from vetted source. http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thompson.pdf http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thom...
  - vkou 5y ago
    That's like saying that seatbelts don't help very much, unless you're willing to wear a motorcycling helmet, and install a roll cage in your car. In the worst-case scenario, no, your seatbelt won't help. I'm still going to wear one.
    - lisper 5y ago
      The difference is that the interior of your car is not typically an adversarial environment.
      - brewdad 5y ago
        The exact moment that you need a seatbelt is the same moment your car's interior becomes an adversarial environment.
        dllthomas 5y ago
        "Adversarial" in this sense is meaningfully different than "dangerous" - at no point is your car trying to outsmart you.
        jfrunyon 5y ago
        You're right, the car isn't trying to outsmart anyone - physics is trying to outsmart engineers.
        dllthomas 5y ago
        Nah, physics doesn't need to try :D
      - ce4 5y ago
        That really depends on your threat model. Every effort to reduce your attack surface increases the effort needed for your adveraries. Your "won't help very much" is only true for the trusting trust problems in the paper, i.e. if you need to survive state sponsored attacks
  - dllthomas 5y ago
    Trusting Trust actually says that vetted source isn't enough! Fortunately it's been defeated (https://dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/ https://dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/), such that vetted source and multiple compiler executables that are unlikely to be compromised in the same way can be enough if you use them carefully (which, to my knowledge, we don't).
- g_p 5y ago
  Bitwarden seems to tick the boxes you need - FOSS license, syncs via an (open source) server which you can host yourself, or use their hosted version, and there's team versions available. It's pretty good. There's also bitwarden_rs (a rust-based server component) if you fancy a simpler self-hosting stack that doesn't require SQL server. The solution has been audited, I believe, but audits are only valid at individual points in time. The only downside for me is the use of electron and web technologies in many of the clients - that for me is a huge attack surface of complexity that few people can fully understand and manage.
  - serial_dev 5y ago
    The mobile clients are written in Xamarin https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile
  - antaviana 5y ago
    Bitwarden says they are hashed and encrypted with your email and master key before leaving your device so it is not possible to get them even if they are ever hacked. So far so good, but how do they protect from hacking or from Bitwarden employees the shared secrets in an organization? I understand that each member of the organization team has their own master key.
    - ivanhoe 5y ago
      > Bitwarden says they are hashed and encrypted with your email and master key before leaving your device so it is not possible to get them even if they are ever hacked. This part makes electron apps even a bigger problem, because if hacker owns the app that's the point where they can grab the password before it's encrypted.
  - laurowyn 5y ago
    Any idea why Bitwarden insist on their installation ID generation for self hosted deployments? it strikes me as unusual, as it's not documented WHY it's necessary, or what the ID is used for, only that you're required to give Bitwarden your email address to get the necessary ID. If they would remove this step, or at the very least explain it, I'd be more likely to deploy and use it. Critical things like password managers should be self hosted where possible, IMO, and this is a blocker preventing trivial deployments.
- edoceo 5y ago
  this https://www.passwordstore.org/ https://www.passwordstore.org/ its "just" a wrapper around gpg and git. so add/crypt with the team and push. and you can do team shared keys if that's your thing. oh, and passbolt is not terrible either.
- Jedd 5y ago
  > Are there any good FOSS password managers that can do remote sync and team permissions? Depending on what remote sync and team permissions looks like at your end, you could perhaps get there with KeePassXC [0] (password manager) and a separate sync tool (that did your sync and, effectively, your permissions management) such as Keybase KBFS [1] or SyncThing [2]. [0] https://keepassxc.org/ https://keepassxc.org/ [1] https://book.keybase.io/docs/files https://book.keybase.io/docs/files [2] https://syncthing.net/ https://syncthing.net/
- timpattinson 5y ago
  I use KeePass + dropbox. Works on windows and android. I'm pretty sure you don't need to trust the syncing software, so anything should work. Someone please correct me if i'm wrong
  - rocqua 5y ago
    Syncing software could perhaps do so cyphertext malleability attacks. Changing the ciphertext, and deducing information on the plaintext based on client behavior. Perhaps they could force you into a password reset for a specific site by corrupting the correct files. That might be an interesting first step for an account takeover. These are highly complicated, active attacks. I wouldn't worry as long as your sync service isn't literally the Russian or Chinese government.
    - jfrunyon 5y ago
      > Perhaps they could force you into a password reset for a specific site by corrupting the correct files. That might be an interesting first step for an account takeover. It would be interesting to see that accomplished without making it obvious (particularly: without corrupting large parts of or the entire database). KeePass encrypts the whole database.
- lrvick 5y ago
  I use Password Store for these use cases and with yubikey tap-to+decrypt which makes bulk exfiltration of passwords virtually impossible.
bigsparky 5y ago
According to Wikipedia Francisco group sold out of NSO in 2019, is that correct?

schlotzisk 5y ago

The post is linking to the comment section of the article. Can you strip the URL of the query string?

1cvmask 5y ago
I think Dang is the only one who can do that once a story is published. You can edit the title but not the url after publishing it.

627467 5y ago

Why would any "enterprise" customers trust closed sourced AND small-time password manager?

boomboomsubban 5y ago
Because they quoted the lowest price for support.
g_p 5y ago
It seems to me there's a trend around "enterprise" software having weaker supply chains than the more nimble and agile tools. Perhaps mindset related? Larger teams needed to meet enterprise needs? Or simply more focus on the sales machine to close complex enterprise deals, and less focus on securing the pipeline through which the product is made? Solarwinds is a great example of this - "big enterprise software" used by big enterprises, and yet their whole build infrastructure was compromised as it ran with less security thinking than your average open source project (which at least discards build environments each run).
- kristov 5y ago
  > It seems to me there's a trend around "enterprise" software having weaker supply chains than the more nimble and agile tools. Or enterprise tools are a more attractive target for attacks. Due to that they should be better at this, so still shame on the slack ones.
- swiley 5y ago
  IME enterprise software is chosen very poorly in general. Microsoft wouldn't be nearly as large now if it weren't for this.
gerdesj 5y ago
You does your risk assessment etc etc. For some those are not a combinatorial red flag - for you it seems they are. There are a lot of things to consider and not one of us here can possibly say they've got it all covered. No one ... ever 8) This morning my home doorbell didn't ring and a phone alarm didn't wake someone up. Two almost unrelated fails. As a result we missed an appointment which we fixed an hour or so later. Right let's do the analysis: Doorbell is a Doorbird. I've got it running on a ethernet connection via PoE. All my home IT stuff is on UPS. I have a decent router that I know very well. I don't skimp on my home gear and I have a quite large VMware esxi which runs my home servers and stuff. I use Home Assistant which has a Doorbird integration and when you press my doorbell all my Sonos speakers say: "Ding dong, there is someone at the door". I got it wrong: I thought that my HA box spoke directly to my Doorbird or vv. No it doesn't - it is all done via their API and that means internets. Today I wired up a simple door chime to my Doorbird which will ring regardless of internets. The chime cost £10. The Doorbird has a chime output which isn't latching but good enough to make a chime ... chime. So that's what I do at home.

shravan20 5y ago

a trend, ain't it?

tediousdemise 5y ago

The best password manager is your own salting algorithm and memory.

cj 5y ago
> your own salting algorithm This can be an OK strategy as long as your salting algorithm is not easy enough to figure out by looking at a few password breaches that you (now or in the future) are exposed by. It can work if you’re smart about the algorithm, but if someone can guess your algorithm by looking at a few leaked passwords, it can provide a false sense of security.
- tediousdemise 5y ago
  That’s a thoughtful consideration. My logic is that a personal salting algorithm could be compromised after several points of failure, whereas a password manager can be compromised by a single point of failure. The former requires trust in myself to create a strong algorithm, and the latter requires trust in a black box.
  - scrollaway 5y ago
    It doesn't have to be a black box. There are open source password managers. Bitwarden and Keepassxc are two very good ones. And keep in mind that even if you can create a reasonably strong algorithm which will both be memorable and resistant to reverse engineering, most people won't. Password managers aren't just good for professionals, they're leagues ahead of anything "mere mortals" use. My mom uses 1password -- that's not a slight, I mean that literally; I put her on my family plan.
    - tediousdemise 5y ago
      I’m in support of password managers if they promote better security hygiene for the average user. Particularly, preventing the most heinous of all password crimes: reuse.
    - 5y ago

cillian64 5y ago

Passwordstate doesn’t seem to have automatic update and the update process is mildly annoying, so I can’t imagine very many people were unlucky enough to update during the couple of days they were compromised. Not saying this isn’t very concerning from Click Studios, just that the number is going to be a lot smaller than 29,000.

lmilcin 5y ago

That's why I don't use password managers. That's giving one entity too much power over everything I own.

StavrosK 5y ago
Do you simply remember hundreds of random passwords?
- w4rh4wk5 5y ago
  Just note them down in a book? I know, it sounds stupid, but nowadays it's a lot easier to keep a small booklet save than a digital file on a connected machine.
  - lmilcin 5y ago
    No, it is not stupid. It is strange how people get blinded by technology and forget about oldest, most reliable methods. I have worked as a security officer at a credit card acquirer (basically, processing credit card transactions between terminal and the bank). The process to safeguard your PINs is extremely complex but at the very end relies on pieces of paper with passwords and key components written down, put in tamper evident envelopes and then into safes.
    - jniedrauer 5y ago
      You're describing backups. The base derivation keys still have to exist in an HSM to be used. No one is opening a safe and hand-typing the BDK each time they need to issue a PIN encryption key.
      - lmilcin 5y ago
        It is not a backup. Backups are made just in case. In case of HSM keys, the HSM itself is built to loose those keys at the least pretense. It is also not possible to retrieve the keys. So whenever you want to provision a new HSM or even just move it couple centimeters (it looses keys when you try to move it) you have to go to the components written on paper. It is just like a password on a website -- you have to be entering it regularly. But once you enter the password you don't need to retype it for every HTTP request. Key components = password HSM = browser Message with PIN block = HTTP request

cryptica 5y ago

That's why I never used and will never use a password manager... You can't get more security by trusting more intermediaries with your passwords. When it comes to anything that matters, you want to trust as few intermediaries as possible. The more entities have access to your passwords, the less secure you are. I can't believe I even have to say it, it seems so obvious. Why not just remember your passwords? There is an infinite number of strategies and secret rules which you can use to easily remember your passwords. Or for low-importance services, why not just use your browser's built-in password manager? You have to trust the browser maker anyway.

scrollaway 5y ago
If you think the concept doesn't make sense, consider that you do not understand it. Highly respected people whose entire careers is security will disagree with you. I'm not telling you to take an argument for authority, but maybe do some introspection about who is more likely to be correct there... Edit: Parent comment edited out some really outrageous claims, so my reply no longer makes as much sense.
- cryptica 5y ago
  Of course security folks who stand to profit from selling these password management solutions will insist that these solutions are important... After all, like you say, their whole career depends on selling 'security products' to companies and individuals. This kind of argument would never stand up in court because of conflict of interests. About the edit, the meaning of my comment hasn't changed. I just removed the phrase "the concept doesn't make any sense" and expanded it to explain why it doesn't make any sense... It's dishonest to say that I've made an outrageous claim or changed the meaning of the comment in any way. But it's good that expanding my reasoning has led you to reconsider the validity of your argument.
  - scrollaway 5y ago
    > But it's good that expanding my reasoning has led you to reconsider the validity of your argument. What I meant is that my first sentence, which references something you removed from your original comment, sounds very out of context now. And no, none of the folks I'm thinking of actually make money from password management solutions. Your comment sounds the same as "of course all those doctors would recommend getting vaccinated since they make a profit from selling you the vaccines". Please, just stop.

cryptica 5y ago

These days I generally don't trust any security product. They are as much malware themselves as the malware which they claim to protect you from. - Many security software providers are hackers or ex-hackers... So you're basically paying hackers to protect you from themselves. Why should I trust software which is almost 100% guaranteed to have been written by hackers more than any other random software I might download from the internet which has maybe a less than 1% chance of having been written by a hacker? - The software security industry is more about selling security products than actually helping to keep people and companies secure. The incentives are to sell peace of mind while keeping systems vulnerable (don't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs). - Most security products capitalize on fear rather than genuine threats (security tools tend to show lots of false positives to draw attention to themselves or to upsell additional software).

scrollaway 5y ago
There's a distinction between "protection" security software such as antiviruses and VPNs which indeed is an industry filled with scams and conmen, and utility security software such as password managers. Most of the big name password managers are very good. The only one I'd recommend avoiding is lastpass, and even so they're not that bad, just strictly worse than the others. Emphasis on big name. 1Password, Bitwarden, keepassx(c), and whatever microsoft's was called.
jfrunyon 5y ago
> Many security software providers are hackers or ex-hackers... So you're basically paying hackers to protect you from themselves. Why should I trust software which is almost 100% guaranteed to have been written by hackers more than any other random software I might download from the internet which has maybe a less than 1% chance of having been written by a hacker? Because the hackers know how other hackers are going to try to break it. Most developers pay literally no attention to the security of their code.

afpx 5y ago

My password manager: a mental hash of some site attributes, my username, and a security level that results in a valid password. A particularly-motivated attacker could easily reverse engineer my hash algorithm, given enough samples. But, good enough for me.

yjftsjthsd-h 5y ago
That's fine until the first time you have to rotate a password, at which point it devolves to, at best, a mnemonic device.
- eeegnu 5y ago
  At that point add a 2 to the end or change your username. Worst case you have to try a few times to get in, but eventually you'll remember it's one of those sites that uses the extra version information.
  - Fethbita 5y ago
    I don't think just appending a character to your password is such a good idea if it is compromised.
    - megous 5y ago
      As a side note, trying various passwords doesn't strike me as a great idea either. You're basically telling the site you're trying to log into your other passwords you use, along with a username. At the very least you're revealing something about how you derive your passwords, if you have some scheme. I'd say that if I'm not sure about the right password, it's safest to go straight for a password reset function, instead of giving all my passwords or a password derivation method to some random website.
  - yjftsjthsd-h 5y ago
    Right, at which point you now have to remember what iteration you're on (mnemonic device), or iterate versions on every login (IMO worse).

nprateem 5y ago

I run Keepassxc in a VM with no networking enabled, and no networking stack enabled in the VM. The clipboard is shared 2-way with the host. I keep the DB on a shared volume so it can be backed up by the host machine.

crispyambulance 5y ago

Nothing is ever perfect. Password managers are good thing and vastly more pragmatic than the folksy homemade "nuclear-launch-code" alternatives some HN'ers describe here. Sticking with my password manager.

_wldu 5y ago

Related: https://www.go350.com/posts/the-design-flaws-of-password-managers/ https://www.go350.com/posts/the-design-flaws-of-password-man...