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https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252496560/Fujitsu-bosses-knew-about-Post-Office-Horizon-IT-flaws-says-insider https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252496560/

https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252496560/Fujitsu-bosses-knew-about-Post-Office-Horizon-IT-flaws-says-insider https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252496560/Fujitsu-bosses... >For the first 10 years of Horizon’s existence, transaction and account data was stored on terminals in each branch before being uploaded to a central database via ISDN. Our source says this part of the system simply did not work. >“The cash account was a piece of software that sat on the counter NT box, asleep all day,” he said. “At the end of the day, or a particular point in the day, it came to life, and it ran through the message store from the point it last finished. It started at a watermark from yesterday and combed through every transaction in the message store, up until the next watermark. >“A lot of the messages in there were nonsense, because there was no data dictionary, there was no API that enforced message integrity. The contents of the message were freehand, you could write whatever you wanted in the code, and everybody did it differently. And then, when you came back three weeks later, you could write it differently again.” And down further >Speaking to Computer Weekly in 2015, the anonymous source told us: “The asynchronous system did not communicate in real time, but does so using a series of messages that are stored and forwarded, when the network connection is available. This means that messages to and from the centre may trip over each other. It is perfectly possible that, if not treated properly, messages from the centre may overwrite data held locally.” >Four years later, former Fujitsu engineer Richard Roll wrote in a witness statement to the High Court: “The issues with coding in the Horizon system were extensive. Furthermore, the coding issues impacted on transaction data and caused financial discrepancies on the Horizon system at branch level.” BUT the most important part >So far, nobody at the Post Office or Fujitsu has been held accountable

WarOnPrivacy 6y ago
The crappy state of rural UK broadband (circa 2010) is proudly on display here. ref: https://www.ingenia.org.uk/Ingenia/Articles/c05470e5-337f-4b4b-896e-71d7e1aeab5b https://www.ingenia.org.uk/Ingenia/Articles/c05470e5-337f-4b... Maybe the FCC went all NYPD-World-Police on the UK - popped over there to run things for a while.
- Mauricebranagh 6y ago
  Didn't have BB back then - this is the sort of application D Chanel was designed for.
- gm3dmo 6y ago
  I don't think the state of broadband can be the cause here. Banks, supermarkets and even GP surgeries were able to support complex accounting systems or patient records for decades. Seems like the Futisu team running Horizon decided to reinvent everything badly. Much of government IT was being given to consultancies like Fujitsu/EDS in the 15 years since 1994. These contracts ended badly: https://www.computerweekly.com/news/1280096810/Why-did-EDS-cough-up-25m-to-HMRC https://www.computerweekly.com/news/1280096810/Why-did-EDS-c... especially for the public paying the bills. Martha Lane Fox and the GDS pointed out the folly of this approach in 2010 https://gds.blog.gov.uk/story-2010/ https://gds.blog.gov.uk/story-2010/ They've done an amazing job overall, but hubris overcame them with things like Verify https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.computerweekly.com/news/252496069/Experian-to-close-more-than-two-million-Govuk-Verify-accounts%3famp=1 https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.computerweekly.com/news/252...
Mauricebranagh 6y ago
Written from the POV of a former BT billing systems developer - The system was designed (fucking badly) before the widespread existence of ADSL. This is what happens when you outsource core financial systems to low cost bidders with dubious tech chops building a message queue system is not fraking rocket science at this point. Back when I worked on the ground up billing system for Telecom Gold (aka Dialcom) we did this as the existing mish mash of dodgy code that Dialcom offered (Sorry Eric) was not up to standard. We had large amounts of internal auditing built in and we tracked discrepancies to the Penny.
TheOtherHobbes 6y ago
That's not (even) the most important part. The most important part is that the PO used these actions to claw back "stolen" money from its postmasters. This money appears to have ended up in its profit and loss account. If true this means that instead of the postmasters stealing from the PO, the PO was stealing from its postmasters. There's been at least one claim - in the Daily Telegraph, so questionably credible, but never mind - that a document exists proving that senior management were aware that the accusations against postmasters were untrue, but carried on regardless. If that document exists it changes the narrative from accidental tech failure and management incomprehension to something less wholesome.
- DaedPsyker 6y ago
  BBC (broadcast so don't have link) said that under the previous CEO that an investigation was shelved into the accusations. Given the number of accusations I have to wonder if there was a cover-up. Jail sentences, bankruptcy and suicide has been caused, management that oversaw this need to face prosecution.
lbriner 6y ago
I think a lot of "normal" people like the idea of holding corporates accountable but how would that actually work? The CEO blames one of their directors; the Director blames the supplier; the supplier blames the requirements documentation; the Business Analysts blame the culture for creating confusing and conflicting requirements. Yes, you can hold the organisation accountable but then the people who worked there back then are long gone, they don't care if the Post Office gets fined £500M. You only have to look at the enquiry into the flammable cladding scandal which was entirely down to fraud, yet, there are people who have not been arrested over their misrepresentation of their products.
- rlpb 6y ago
  > I think a lot of "normal" people like the idea of holding corporates accountable but how would that actually work? Exactly which specific problem is "holding corporates accountable" trying to fix? If it's that postmasters were being falsely convicted, then the way to fix that is to raise the burden of proof significantly. I hope this case has done that, and next time a court will not accept "computer says so". With that fixed, the corporates would have to take the (falsely reported) losses; they wouldn't be able to pass it on to the postmasters like they did. Then the consequences of the problem will remain with the people responsible. Is that sufficient?
  - rectang 6y ago
    No, it is not sufficient. The problem is that it is possible to design malicious systems which through incentives, ensure that illegal acts will take place, yet only low-level actors are ever punished. The people who architected the systems and made the decisions statistically guaranteeing illegal activity escape punishment through plausible deniability and abscond with their ill-gotten gains. Besides this scandal, see the failure to punish any executives after the 2007 crash, or Carrie Tolstedt and John Stumpf of Wells Fargo who even after clawbacks retired tens of millions of dollars ahead, etc.
- jjk166 6y ago
  At some (or perhaps more than one) point there was someone who was responsible for ensuring that the system put in place complied with requirements and that it was functioning as intended. They didn't do their job. They can point their finger any which way, but that won't absolve them of dereliction of duty.

WarOnPrivacy 6y ago

The crappy state of rural UK broadband (circa 2010) is proudly on display here. ref: https://www.ingenia.org.uk/Ingenia/Articles/c05470e5-337f-4b4b-896e-71d7e1aeab5b https://www.ingenia.org.uk/Ingenia/Articles/c05470e5-337f-4b... Maybe the FCC went all NYPD-World-Police on the UK - popped over there to run things for a while.

Mauricebranagh 6y ago
Didn't have BB back then - this is the sort of application D Chanel was designed for.
gm3dmo 6y ago
I don't think the state of broadband can be the cause here. Banks, supermarkets and even GP surgeries were able to support complex accounting systems or patient records for decades. Seems like the Futisu team running Horizon decided to reinvent everything badly. Much of government IT was being given to consultancies like Fujitsu/EDS in the 15 years since 1994. These contracts ended badly: https://www.computerweekly.com/news/1280096810/Why-did-EDS-cough-up-25m-to-HMRC https://www.computerweekly.com/news/1280096810/Why-did-EDS-c... especially for the public paying the bills. Martha Lane Fox and the GDS pointed out the folly of this approach in 2010 https://gds.blog.gov.uk/story-2010/ https://gds.blog.gov.uk/story-2010/ They've done an amazing job overall, but hubris overcame them with things like Verify https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.computerweekly.com/news/252496069/Experian-to-close-more-than-two-million-Govuk-Verify-accounts%3famp=1 https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.computerweekly.com/news/252...

Mauricebranagh 6y ago

Written from the POV of a former BT billing systems developer - The system was designed (fucking badly) before the widespread existence of ADSL. This is what happens when you outsource core financial systems to low cost bidders with dubious tech chops building a message queue system is not fraking rocket science at this point. Back when I worked on the ground up billing system for Telecom Gold (aka Dialcom) we did this as the existing mish mash of dodgy code that Dialcom offered (Sorry Eric) was not up to standard. We had large amounts of internal auditing built in and we tracked discrepancies to the Penny.

TheOtherHobbes 6y ago

That's not (even) the most important part. The most important part is that the PO used these actions to claw back "stolen" money from its postmasters. This money appears to have ended up in its profit and loss account. If true this means that instead of the postmasters stealing from the PO, the PO was stealing from its postmasters. There's been at least one claim - in the Daily Telegraph, so questionably credible, but never mind - that a document exists proving that senior management were aware that the accusations against postmasters were untrue, but carried on regardless. If that document exists it changes the narrative from accidental tech failure and management incomprehension to something less wholesome.

DaedPsyker 6y ago
BBC (broadcast so don't have link) said that under the previous CEO that an investigation was shelved into the accusations. Given the number of accusations I have to wonder if there was a cover-up. Jail sentences, bankruptcy and suicide has been caused, management that oversaw this need to face prosecution.

lbriner 6y ago

I think a lot of "normal" people like the idea of holding corporates accountable but how would that actually work? The CEO blames one of their directors; the Director blames the supplier; the supplier blames the requirements documentation; the Business Analysts blame the culture for creating confusing and conflicting requirements. Yes, you can hold the organisation accountable but then the people who worked there back then are long gone, they don't care if the Post Office gets fined £500M. You only have to look at the enquiry into the flammable cladding scandal which was entirely down to fraud, yet, there are people who have not been arrested over their misrepresentation of their products.

rlpb 6y ago
> I think a lot of "normal" people like the idea of holding corporates accountable but how would that actually work? Exactly which specific problem is "holding corporates accountable" trying to fix? If it's that postmasters were being falsely convicted, then the way to fix that is to raise the burden of proof significantly. I hope this case has done that, and next time a court will not accept "computer says so". With that fixed, the corporates would have to take the (falsely reported) losses; they wouldn't be able to pass it on to the postmasters like they did. Then the consequences of the problem will remain with the people responsible. Is that sufficient?
- rectang 6y ago
  No, it is not sufficient. The problem is that it is possible to design malicious systems which through incentives, ensure that illegal acts will take place, yet only low-level actors are ever punished. The people who architected the systems and made the decisions statistically guaranteeing illegal activity escape punishment through plausible deniability and abscond with their ill-gotten gains. Besides this scandal, see the failure to punish any executives after the 2007 crash, or Carrie Tolstedt and John Stumpf of Wells Fargo who even after clawbacks retired tens of millions of dollars ahead, etc.
jjk166 6y ago
At some (or perhaps more than one) point there was someone who was responsible for ensuring that the system put in place complied with requirements and that it was functioning as intended. They didn't do their job. They can point their finger any which way, but that won't absolve them of dereliction of duty.