Wow, that video made my day. This bit is key: > "For example, by including a specially formatted but otherwise innocuous file in an app on a device that is the

Wow, that video made my day. This bit is key: > "For example, by including a specially formatted but otherwise innocuous file in an app on a device that is then scanned by Cellebrite, it’s possible to execute code that modifies not just the Cellebrite report being created in that scan, but also all previous and future generated Cellebrite reports from all previously scanned devices and all future scanned devices in any arbitrary way (inserting or removing text, email, photos, contacts, files, or any other data), with no detectable timestamp changes or checksum failures. This could even be done at random, and would seriously call the data integrity of Cellebrite’s reports into question." They've may have just got a lot evidence collected using Cellebrite from phones with (or without) Signal installed on them thrown out of court. I don't recall the details, but there was an absolute unsubstantiated speculative and surely fictional rumor of at least one entirely theoretical zero-day non-gif formatted image file that exploited a similar class of vulnerability in what was probably not a market leading tool used tangentially for the same purposes, floating around well over a decade ago as well. I for one am very glad that these hypothetical issues have almost surely been fixed.