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So I wonder, why disclose this? This will just prompt Cellebrite to improve its security process and sandbox the entire tool. If they wanted to destroy the cr
by Nextgrid 6y ago
So I wonder, why disclose this?
This will just prompt Cellebrite to improve its security process and sandbox the entire tool.
If they wanted to destroy the credibility of the tool, using the vulnerabilities to silently tamper with the collected data or even leaking it online would be a much better option and hit them without any warning, not only jeopardizing those cases but forever casting doubt on not just Cellebrite but their competitor tools.
- godelski 6y agoAny court case where Cellebrite's tools have been used are now in jeopardy since the defence can just say that they were hacked by someone else. There's now reasonable doubt that Cellebrite can't be trusted. This damages their reputation with governments too.
- tptacek 6y agoNot really. The same circumstances exist for almost all digital evidence. Of course, a lot of Cellebrite usage is extrajudicial already.
- godelski 6y agoIf you're failing some basic security it isn't going to give much confidence. But also users don't know now if their systems will explode if they try to gather Signal (or other app) data.
- tptacek 6y agoThe quality of forensics software is extremely low; a similar story was once written about EnCase, and had zero impact on any legal case anywhere.
- polar 6y agohttps://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/forensics-software-and-oracle-outside-in/ https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/forensics-software-and-ora... ?
- wglb 6y agoAs in https://www.securityweek.com/forensics-tool-flaw-allows-hackers-manipulate-evidence#:~:text=A%20vulnerability%20in%20Guidance%20Software's,the%20flaw%20any%20time%20soon https://www.securityweek.com/forensics-tool-flaw-allows-hack...., yet it is used in cases large and small, civil, criminal, federal state.
- tptacek 6y agoMatt Blaze did some research on this, and it seems to turn out that when you put an argument like this in front of a judge or jury, ultimately you have to back it up with evidence that it actually happened; it's not enough to say that the potential existed. Which makes sense, because the potential exists for a lot of stuff, including stuff we don't often talk about.
- wglb 6y agoI think this post by signal is not much beyond exceedingly well-crafted nerd sniping [edited for claity]
- wglb 6y agoThis is unlikely to be the case, despite the vulnerabilities that are described. The process of e-discovery is rife with risks of this sort. When you forensically collect data from a random set of devices from a party that may or may not have porn, HIPAA, GDPR, sample viruses, malware, who know what all. The short version of it even if the inhaling of this data crashes the device, there are mitigations and protections that will allow the evidence to be ultimately produced. A crash of the windows host in collection will not invalidate the case. disclosure: ex-CSO of Relativity, leading provider of e-discovery software.
- Zak 6y agoThe vulnerability claimed here doesn't necessarily crash the computer running the software. It runs arbitrary code, and said code is able to modify the data Cellebrite extracts. It is not clear whether it is possible to detect whether data collected in the past is compromised. There may be mitigations, but without knowing the full details of the exploit, it sounds a lot like reasonable doubt to me. A good lawyer would spin it exactly that way, putting any cases without sufficient corroborating evidence in jeopardy.
- wglb 6y agoIf the data is off on another server, it seems unlikely that past cases can be compromised. There are a whole set of rules about challenging evidence, including electronic evidence. Keep in mind that the other side gets a crack at it also. It is unlikely that the whole case would be thrown out because of a corrupted file. Reasonable doubt is not part of the forensic process--this is what a jury needs to consider to render a verdict. As pointed out elsewhere, many uses of this tool are extrajudicial.
- holtalanm 6y ago> If the data is off on another server, it seems unlikely that past cases can be compromised. That isn't the point being made here. The data could have been compromised at the point of when it was gathered, not any time later.
- po 6y agoSandboxing doesn't fix the problem. The problem isn't the same as a consumer app where you're trying to protect the OS from being rooted. Their problem is they need to protect the integrity of the report it generates because that's the thing that makes them money. edit: One thing they could try to do is to sandbox the parser itself to lower attack surface area... but the damage is done here and I really doubt they will win a security tit-for-tat with Signal.
- kbenson 6y ago> sandbox the entire tool. Sandboxing doesn't really help. The problem isn't that the tool is used to infect the rest of the system, but that the tool itself is compromised, the reports it generates are compromised, and and past reports may be compromised. Unless you're pushing that data outside the sandbox (which is a hole in the sandbox, and while much more limited might also be an exploit vector or a way to cause problems in the data) it's still fair game if the sandboxed tool is compromised. There's multiple reasons to disclose it. First, because as another comment noted it attacks the credibility of the company, and credibility is very important for tools used in court. Second, because their main goal is to protect Signal, not attack Cellebrite. Making Signal a problem to attempt to gather data about will possibly make them just blacklist Signal as an app they gather for. This could be temporary, but since Signal alluded to many exploits and that they have a bunch queued up for the future, it will always be a risk for Cellebrite to attempt to gather info from Signal, so they might just continue to skip it.
- acdha 6y agoThis is too quick a dismissal: if they sandboxed each extraction tool they'd be more likely to be able to say that a compromised tool did not compromise the entire system or data collected by other tools. This is exactly why programs like browsers, messaging clients, etc. have moved things like media decoders into separate processes, especially since those tools can be sandboxed quite aggressively whereas a monolithic program will use a fair number of different permissions.
- kbenson 6y agoSure, sandboxing all the individual components and not just the whole would help. That's not what was being suggested though, and is a significantly more complex and labor intensive task than even just fixing all the the included libraries to be more recent and not have known exploits (even thought it would pay dividends later). I wasn't dismissing sandboxing as an effective tool, just noting that it's likely not all that effective to put it all in one sandbox as suggested (and since actually fixing all the problems is likely a lot of work, it doesn't negate the effectiveness of the strategy of Signal by providing an easy solution to the problem).
- choppaface 6y agoThe public disclosure about the Apple DLLs could potentially be used to drag Apple into any legal case between somebody versus Cellebrite. The disclosure needs to be public versus private or under seal or whatever to absolve the Cellebrite counterparty of any liability from reverse engineering. Suddenly Apple is now in potential collusion with Cellebrite. Or maybe not. This public disclosure makes the threat of Discovery a bit less toothless. IANAL but I could imagine Cellebrite has existing or pending litigation where this disclosure upsets their position.
- redleader55 6y agoI think they mention Apple in an attempt to force them to defend their copyright, else they risk losing it. I assume Apple will choose to file for copyright infringement than risk being accused of collusion and lose the copyright on that iTunes or parts of it.
- seba_dos1 6y agoThat's not how copyrights work, you're confusing it with trademarks.
- Gaelan 6y agoRight, but Apple now has to choose between suing Cellebrite and (tacitly) condoning their behavior. Not the same as losing the copyright, for sure, but still. Not clear which the parent was talking about. Maybe both?
- supergirl 6y agodoes cellebrite appear in any legit court cases? from this blog post it sounds like only "authoritarian" regimes use it. i doubt it would appear in any legit case. it's a shady tool. they'll use it to gather info but will not present this info directly in court, instead use it to gather legitimate proof, if needed.
- syntheticcorp 6y ago
- Zarathust 6y agoIt seems to be a retaliatory measure against this: > When Cellebrite announced that they added Signal support to their software, all it really meant was that they had added support to Physical Analyzer for the file formats used by Signal. Your case is valid about potential judiciary impact, but it would require for Signal to monitor cases involving Cellebrite and step forward to help the defense while unprompted to do so. Furthermore, Cellebrite clients seems to include entities that do not care so much about a fair trial.
- tptacek 6y agoWhether Cellebrite is secure or not has really not much impact on Signal. Shore up Cellebrite's security, don't, either way, pretty much same threat to users. But calling them out like this could force them to placate their customers by spending money on software security --- something they apparently haven't been doing --- and inflicting costs on your adversary is good praxis.
- psd1 6y agoI bet Sun Tzu would also extol the value of allowing your weekend to remain complacent. This disclosure may make them harden up.
- faitswulff 6y agoSignal may have had countermeasures in place long before the blog post, as well.
- eli 6y agoFor one thing, it could otherwise waste a lot of time for the poor white hat hacker who tries to figure out why this oddly formatted file suddenly exists in the app data. And it doesn't destroy the credibility of the tool to silently mess with its data. People have to know it's happening.
- spinny 6y agoProbably disclosure is the best option. Silently tamper with the data might cross a legal line. doing this might put at risk current or past cases where there is a legitimate reason to use this sort of tool. Privacy can be hard. While i 100% defend everybody has the right to privacy, i can also see the need for the capability to break it. Maybe the answer for this is a very tight regulation around the uses of this kind of hardware/software, but that regulation would have to keep up with the pace of technology
- a-dub 6y ago> Privacy can be hard. While i 100% defend everybody has the right to privacy, i can also see the need for the capability to break it. Maybe the answer for this is a very tight regulation around the uses of this kind of hardware/software, but that regulation would have to keep up with the pace of technology i've always wondered if there could be a cryptographic solution to this. issuing decryption keys to governments seems rife for abuse, but some sort of multi-party situation where governmental and non-governmental entities have to cooperate (with actual multiparty key material) to perform a decryption authorized by warrants- with said non-governmental agencies acting as a check on usage of those warrants, their frequency and the eventual publication of their usage could be an interesting approach. personally i think strong encryption should be a requirement for digital evidence, but even that can be forged. strange times we live in.
- toast0 6y ago> i've always wondered if there could be a cryptographic solution to this. issuing decryption keys to governments seems rife for abuse, but some sort of multi-party situation where governmental and non-governmental entities have to cooperate (with actual multiparty key material) to perform a decryption authorized by warrants- with said non-governmental agencies acting as a check on usage of those warrants, their frequency and the eventual publication of their usage could be an interesting approach. I would be willing to consider a solution where you need to have agreement from the UN Security council (maybe just the permanent members) in order to decrypt whatever you want. If you can get those countries to agree, it's probably important.