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The recently discussed[1][2] method of hijacking SMS with almost zero effort was an eye opener to me. I had thought it required social engineering my carrier.
by tyingq 6y ago
The recently discussed[1][2] method of hijacking SMS with almost zero effort was an eye opener to me. I had thought it required social engineering my carrier. Nope, just a $15 service.
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26469738 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26469738
[2] https://lucky225.medium.com/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-for-anything-203c41361c80 https://lucky225.medium.com/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-for-a...
[3] https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/03/can-we-stop-pretending-sms-is-secure-now/ https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/03/can-we-stop-pretending-s...
Edit...added [3] above. Apparently, it's a $16 service, not $15: https://sakari.io/pricing/ https://sakari.io/pricing/
- g_p 6y agoIndeed! And if you have access to SS7, you can do it without the middle-man $15 service! These systems are really designed for use in a world where only trusted actors have any access to the system! That's clearly not true with all these third parties exposing functionality to the general public! [1] https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet...
- thaumasiotes 6y ago> And if you have access to SS7, you can do it without the middle-man $15 service! This doesn't really seem to make things any worse. Surely it's easier to have $15 than it is to have access to SS7.
- MayeulC 6y agoRight, but $15 a piece makes it only worth it for targeted attacks. Even if it's harder or more expensive to get access to SS7, it might become economical to attempt MITM on a larger target base once you do.
- myself248 6y agoYeah, but say you want to hijack a million accounts. It's easier to have access to SS7 than $15 million.
- thaumasiotes 6y agoWhat's the threat model there?
- nine_k 6y agoInstalling a backdoor to a a piece of equipment that handles SS7, for instance?
- thaumasiotes 6y agoNo, what is the threat model for the agent who wants to hijack text messages to a million random phones? Why are they doing it?
- hansvm 6y agoOff the top of my head: - Major players are using phone numbers to de-dup people. Use your million phone numbers to bypass such verifications and aggregate more power than intended. You could sell the accounts directly or monetize them individually (e.g., social media like farms, turning cloud free trials into dogecoin, ...). - Way too many services believe that if you control a phone/email you must be the account holder. Banks, 401k managers, and other critical pieces of infrastructure are more than happy to harvest your phone number for "added security" and proceed to weaken the security on your account by allowing anyone with control of that phone number to hijack the account. - Unique phone numbers are valuable in their own right. Individual numbers have max message rates and other garbage, but with an army of phone numbers you can, e.g., send out the same scam message to most phone numbers, see who bites, and use that to build a curated list of a hopefully much smaller set of numbers to target with real people. - If you have any extra information like a plausible contact graph you can use that to impersonate people for viral marketing or something (kind of like how the Marco Polo app texted your entire contact list without your permission). I'm pretty sure permissions are way more locked down than they were when apps used to just use your phone directly, but if you control the phone number and have that contact info then you could pull off a similar marketing trick still today. - Just snooping on the information is probably valuable. I'm struggling to imagine how you'd monetize it directly (some kind of insider trading?), but 1M person-hours worth of intercepted texts can't be worth <=$0 I don't think.
- gsich 6y agoAnd how to get that?
- g_p 6y agoIt's not a publicly facing service that's on offer, but some smaller telcos and sketchy VoIP providers with legacy access often re-sell it. There's some good CCC talks on the subject if it's of interest.
- walrus01 6y agoThe funny part about that is the $15 hijack service was predicated on the flimsy legal fig leaf of somebody writing in an ink signature on a piece of paper and scanning it to port a number (term is an LOA, letter of authorization), same as I have to do when I port a bunch of DIDs between voip providers. Literally anyone with a printer and a pen can forge any signature and have a fairly high degree of success in the porting process.