If your threat model includes the threat of your government torturing you for information, then you don't need to worry about whether they are able to decrypt y

If your threat model includes the threat of your government torturing you for information, then you don't need to worry about whether they are able to decrypt your data because they could just as easily plant some false evidence, or simply "disappear" you. Specifically on the issue of plausible deniability, though, you probably don't want just a 1 GB blob of random-looking data, you want a file system with various levels of "secret compartments" which open up depending on which key you use to open it. The game theory is that this prevents the attack you describe (and after which Assange named this countermeasure) because you could never prove to your torturers that you have given them the last key, and thus you would have no reason to comply. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_%28file_system%29 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_%28file_system%29