4 ms·
Password managers that use authenticated encryption are not vulnerable to such attacks. Well, it's more a hypothetical attack, in practice you're more likely to
by GoblinSlayer 6y ago
Password managers that use authenticated encryption are not vulnerable to such attacks. Well, it's more a hypothetical attack, in practice you're more likely to get a keylogger.
- taeric 6y agoI'm not sure what you mean by authenticated encryption. I'm assuming you just meant single key encryption. My question is if those are really on a different set of math, as my understanding was that they were not, all told. If you can bust public/private key encryption, you can typically bust all encryption. Is that not necessarily the case?
- GoblinSlayer 6y agoPass uses public key to encrypt files, an attacker needs to know only the public key to forge pass files, and that public key isn't secret, it's stored in plain, unencrypted, that's why you can create pass files without entering master password that protects private key which is not used to create pass files. That's the catch with asymmetric encryption.
- taeric 6y agoBut what is the threat vector? I have to pull the attacker's changes into repo. And... I would still have the old passwords. How does this help an attacker get my passwords?
- GoblinSlayer 6y agoIt's not a certainty of abuse, only uneasiness about technical feasibility. Historically abuse of forgery was clever and unpredictable, as a result design of cryptographic systems tries to prevent forgery when possible. A hypothesis: pass prints text from decrypted file to terminal, terminals have rich functionality, legacy features and wide attack surface, so text printed to terminal is an attack vector.