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I think this point is too technical to be addressed in this blog post, and it's already addressed in technical documents / talks from MobileCoin. In short, and
by hiq 6y ago
I think this point is too technical to be addressed in this blog post, and it's already addressed in technical documents / talks from MobileCoin. In short, and IIUC, no Intel SGX means a bit less privacy but is still ok. In particular, it's not a kill-switch. Happy to be corrected though, I still know little about MobileCoin.
- gojomo 6y agoIt's true an SGX compromise means most of the MobileCoin privacy goals are still met. But dsome compromises would open up new methods of traffic analysis, and the SGX-dependency still makes the consensus process dependent on Intel's trustworthy key-management. If I understand correctly, Intel could (if compromised or untrustworthy): * revoke any node's SGX keys - knocking any number of consensus nodes out at zero cost * create false attestations of what code was run (which would presumably be detectd eventually) * dominate the consensus mechanism with its hand-picked SGX nodes Among other things, this means Intel could turn off the MobileCoin chain, if commanded to do so. (I could be somewhat off on some of this – if so, corrections with explanations very welcome.) So, if your threat model is "Intel Inc is always trustworthy & secure", Signal & MobileCoin are wonderful. If you have doubts about Intel's trustworthiness/security, the designed privacy properties start to degrade.