6 ms·
TorBox v.0.4.0
- vmception 6y agoCan I just order one of these? I never even glued the raspberri pi and fan and case together to even get to the point of loading this, and this package is supposed to be the convenience I just want the tiny computer router out the box loading this anybody have that?
- osobo 6y agoFour your consideration: I think the continued updating of the package and the Pi to keep it from turning into a security hazard by itself will prove to be more work than just whacking together a Pi.
- nuker 6y ago> I never even glued the raspberri pi and fan and case together Me neither... but I heard that hot glue works, on everything!
- yosito 6y agoOrdering one of these is a bad idea because the physical device could easily be intercepted and have a backdoor or spyware installed.
- 908087 6y agoIf setting up a raspberry pi with this image is too much for you, you probably shouldn't be running it anyway... and that's even before getting into all the potential issues with buying one of these "ready to go" from someone else.
- traspler 6y agoIt's commendable that the project states "anonymity is hard to get – solely using Tor doesn’t guarantee it" and "it is strongly advised not to use TorBox if your well-being depends on your anonymity". Other such solutions like to gloss over the fact that "using tor !== anonymity" and even the Tor Browser does a lot more to help with anonymity than just route your traffic through tor. I'm still not sure where such a solution would be a good choice though. Getting access to the broader, uncensored internet is also not as easy as it seems in countries where this applies, e.g. China, as even getting an entry node that works is not easy so this is not a plug'n'play option anymore for that.
- BelenusMordred 6y ago> uncensored internet is also not as easy as it seems in countries where this applies, e.g. China The Chinese mostly use shadowsocks. Tor usage from a mainland ip entry point is incredibly low.
- tutfbhuf 6y ago> Shadowsocks is a free and open-source encryption protocol project, widely used in China to circumvent Internet censorship. It was created in 2012 by a Chinese programmer named "clowwindy", and multiple implementations of the protocol have been made available since. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shadowsocks https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shadowsocks
- traspler 6y agoShadowsocks and similar tools are mainly about obfuscating your traffic flow so it‘s harder to classify and block by the GFW, right? The Tor Project has the „obfsproxy“ project for that I think, or is that aimed at something else? I always wondered why that did not overtake shadowsocks.
- superkuh 6y agoI use shadowsocks-libev for everything these days. It's UDP so unlike TCP it isn't quite as vulnerable to, say, central government or ISP mediated forged TCP reset packets. It's way faster than a ssh socks proxy too since it isn't limited to one connection. And it's tiny and requires very little CPU resources and only about 2 MB of ram. It's getting less and less funny that I have to use the same methods as chinese citizens living under a dictator for life just to avoid my ISP attacking my HTTP connections.
- yosito 6y agoFrom the first half of your comment, I assumed you were talking about connecting from China.
- zo1 6y agoWhat would you say is a good place to find Shadowsocks? Looks like the main repo is empty: https://github.com/shadowsocks/shadowsocks https://github.com/shadowsocks/shadowsocks with the readme stating "Removed according to regulations."
- nuker 6y agoCan you switch to OpenBSD? It is the best for such things.
- anthk 6y agoSecurity is not the same as anonymity. Altough you have torsocks, tor, tor-browser and i2pd in ports in order to try. I didnt try i2pd yet, tho.
- TorDev 6y agoDO NOT ROUTE REGULAR TRAFFIC OVER TOR TRANSPARENTLY Sorry for the uppercase, but transparent proxies are dangerous, *especially* if users are not aware of them. Applications that are not explicitly designed to use Tor can often leak data or be vulnerable to malicious exit nodes. Also, this pattern can create false sense of security. See warnings: https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TransparentProxy#warning https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/Transp...
- devwastaken 6y agoSo this is something you should only be using tor applications through? The benefit of a tor box is that it's much more immune to exploitation from the local machine leaking data - if done right. It'd be nice if you could simply point tails at this but afaik it's bad to do tor over tor.
- arsome 6y agoNot necessarily only Tor applications, also works well for VMs/physical machines created specifically to be used directly in a Tor only environment, where none of your data is otherwise associated with them. I use this for malware reverse engineering for example.
- EveYoung 6y agoYou could use Whonix instead and run the Whonix-Gateway on a different machine (e.g., Rasperry Pi).
- GoblinSlayer 6y ago>Also, this pattern can create false sense of security. Tor provides obscurity, not security, even for applications designed to use tor. And even then obscurity isn't lower, in clearnet you have zero obscurity.
- vmception 6y agoCorrect, I think the best use case for this is if it functioned as a dedicated Tor Exit Node, but I don't get the impression that it does that
- gradschool 6y agoIronically, the project's web page greets Tor users with that ubiquitous Cloudflare captcha.
- hnjst 6y agoProbably not through http://expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion/ http://expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion/ ;)
- hnjst 6y agoAfter a short moment of outrage I saw the important and required notice not too deep in the project description: > [...] it is strongly advised not to use TorBox if your well-being depends on your anonymity. In such a situation, it is advisable to use Tails [...] My advice for anyone considering this kind of setup (tunneling blindly a set of clients through tor) would be to 1) make sure they understand the limitations of the approach, especially when clients behave "normally" (a.k.a. actively leaking identifying information) while sharing a circuit and 2) have a look at the considerations that projects like the tor browser or tails are focusing on in order to measure how fragile tor "anonymity" features are. I feel it's useful to insist on it: DON'T RELY ON THIS KIND OF SETUP FOR CRITICAL OPS. Besides these warnings, I have a hard time figuring a sensible use case for this (I may lack imagination though). One useful (but unrelated, from what I got from my quick glance on TFA) feature of tor that I enjoy and that is orthogonal to its "anonymity" features is the ease of exposing an onion service (reverse tunnel like) from inside a firewall'd/NAT'd network.