End of section 2.4 contains this gem, "The manufacturing of ID cards has always been a closed, non-transparent activity, not open to scrutiny even to

End of section 2.4 contains this gem, "The manufacturing of ID cards has always been a closed, non-transparent activity, not open to scrutiny even to the manufacturer’s contracting partner – the Estonian state. The personalization protocols and procedures have never beenpublicly documented, leaving the security aspects of this process to bedetermined by the competency of the ID card manufacturer. As described inSection 6.8 of this work, this lack of supervision oversight allowed the ID cardmanufacturer to engage in activities that compromised the ID card securitywithout it being detected for years." Card personalization is the bootstrapping problem, and there is another one with potentially hostile readers creating DoS conditions. I've worked on ID cards and digital identity in a few areas in both private and public sectors, and the threat model basically disappears into a cloud of spooky agencies, and it comes out the other end as a vague consensus to just move forward. If you think voting machines are unreliable you haven't seen anything until you've looked into digital identity, as it's a massive host of unresolved political problems tossed over the fence onto technologists, and then laundered back through opaque entities like the ones in this doc, then presented as a good idea. My impression of identity is it's not a technology problem, but there are lots of people who will take your money to let you say that it is.