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Chain of custody is standard for evidence already. It might not be 100% infallible, but it certainly works better than nothing. Yes, if a state actor wants to

by jjk166 6y ago

Chain of custody is standard for evidence already. It might not be 100% infallible, but it certainly works better than nothing. Yes, if a state actor wants to create evidence to frame you, and they didn't care about cost or returns, they could do so. But they could always do so. The fact is most of us are never going to get framed by a nation state. The notion that you're either secure against all possible attacks or nothing is absurd.

AnthonyMouse 6y ago
Chain of custody implies you have some impartial authority who was actually there at the time to authenticate the recording. But then you would already have an impartial eyewitness. That doesn't work the other 99% of the time when the two parties to the case each tell a different story and one of them is offering evidence they have in their possession. The chain of custody then contains someone partial to the case and untrustworthy. > Yes, if a state actor wants to create evidence to frame you, and they didn't care about cost or returns, they could do so. But they could always do so. The fact is most of us are never going to get framed by a nation state. This is a major problem for elections. Nation states absolutely will doctor video of adversarial political candidates and for other propaganda purposes. > The notion that you're either secure against all possible attacks or nothing is absurd. But that's how signatures work. You're trusting every device in the world to sign the output of its camera. If the attacker can compromise any device, they can produce signed forgeries.
- jjk166 6y ago
  You're describing a situation where the recording ought not to be admissible anyways. If you can't trust where evidence came from, it's not evidence. Again, nation states have always been able to doctor video of adversarial political candidates. Lookup pictures where the KGB made someone disappear. Yes, if an attacker can compromise any device they can produce a signed forgery. But that's a really big if. There are a lot of potential attackers who can't compromise any and all devices, and signatures protect against them.
moftz 6y ago
I guess the weakpoint in all of these techniques to prove a photo was taken by a certain device, at a certain time, in a certain place is for someone wearing a very good disguise to publicly commit crimes in your name. Any witnesses or photo evidence is going to point to you. A full movie costume makeup kit probably costs less than what it takes to hack Apple for someone's iPhone private key.

by jjk166 6y ago

AnthonyMouse 6y ago

Chain of custody implies you have some impartial authority who was actually there at the time to authenticate the recording. But then you would already have an impartial eyewitness. That doesn't work the other 99% of the time when the two parties to the case each tell a different story and one of them is offering evidence they have in their possession. The chain of custody then contains someone partial to the case and untrustworthy. > Yes, if a state actor wants to create evidence to frame you, and they didn't care about cost or returns, they could do so. But they could always do so. The fact is most of us are never going to get framed by a nation state. This is a major problem for elections. Nation states absolutely will doctor video of adversarial political candidates and for other propaganda purposes. > The notion that you're either secure against all possible attacks or nothing is absurd. But that's how signatures work. You're trusting every device in the world to sign the output of its camera. If the attacker can compromise any device, they can produce signed forgeries.

jjk166 6y ago
You're describing a situation where the recording ought not to be admissible anyways. If you can't trust where evidence came from, it's not evidence. Again, nation states have always been able to doctor video of adversarial political candidates. Lookup pictures where the KGB made someone disappear. Yes, if an attacker can compromise any device they can produce a signed forgery. But that's a really big if. There are a lot of potential attackers who can't compromise any and all devices, and signatures protect against them.

moftz 6y ago

I guess the weakpoint in all of these techniques to prove a photo was taken by a certain device, at a certain time, in a certain place is for someone wearing a very good disguise to publicly commit crimes in your name. Any witnesses or photo evidence is going to point to you. A full movie costume makeup kit probably costs less than what it takes to hack Apple for someone's iPhone private key.