11 ms·

A lot of these comments are just manifestations of the kneejerk HN "crypto bad" reflex. Here's the deal: - Whether or not Signal's server is open source has no

by woah 6y ago

A lot of these comments are just manifestations of the kneejerk HN "crypto bad" reflex. Here's the deal: - Whether or not Signal's server is open source has nothing to do with security. Signal's security rests on the user's knowledge that the open source client is encrypting messages end to end. With that knowledge, the server code could be anything, and Signal inc. would still not be able to read your messages. In fact, having the server code open source adds absolutely nothing to this security model, because no matter how open source and secure the server code might be, Signal inc. could still be logging messages upstream of it. The security rests only upon the open source client code. The server is completely orthogonal to security. - Signal's decision to keep early development of the MobileCoin feature set private was valid. Signal is not your weekend node.js module with two stars on Github. When changes get made to the repo, they will be noticed. This might mess up their marketing plan, especially if they weren't even sure whether they were going to end up going live with the feature. Signal is playing in the big leagues, competing with messengers which have billions of dollars in marketing budget, will never ever be even the smallest amount open source, and are selling all your messages to the highest bidder. They can't afford to handicap themselves just to keep some guys on Hacker News happy. - Signal's decision to keep development to the (private) master branch, instead of splitting the MobileCoin integration into a long-running feature branch is a valid choice. It's a lot of work to keep a feature branch up to date over years, and to split every feature up into the public and non-public components which then get committed to separate branches. This would greatly affect their architecture and slow down shipping for no benefit, given that the open sourceness of the server is orthogonal to security.

unhammer 6y ago
> The security rests only upon the open source client code. The server is completely orthogonal to security. For Android at least, builds are reproducible https://signal.org/blog/reproducible-android/ https://signal.org/blog/reproducible-android/ (would be neat if there was one or more third party CI's that also checked that the CI-built app reproduces the one on Google Play Store – or maybe there already are?)
- cptskippy 6y ago
  That's pretty neat, I wasn't aware that was possible.
- hnjst 6y ago
  While I find laudable this effort and consider it a valid security improvement, the fact that Signal is opposed to alternate clients (and even builds from other sources like FDroid) opens another orthogonal risk. I doubt that many people rebuild the app at each update to check that the new binaries match the ones provided by their store. If, for example, the PlayStore distributed at large a binary that doesn't match the published sources, some dedicated user would probably spot the issue. However, the PlayStore (and Signal, but it's not even necessary for the following) being under US jurisdiction, any user not checking each update it receives is vulnerable to the NSL + gag order famous combo in case of a targeted attack. I recognize that this is probably something that most people do not include in their threat model but I'm still a bit dubious about the fact that convenience related to release management and not having to worry about interoperability is worth accepting the risks linked to a unique delivery channel, especially for what could (and is widely thought to) be a completely secure IM solution. "Almost secure" is frighteningly the worse obstacle to "secure"... I'm admittedly biased since I'm convinced that federation, multiple client/server implementations and multiple distribution channels are a requirement for a secure IM infrastructure (which is why my heart goes to Matrix nowadays).
lucideer 6y ago
> - Whether or not Signal's server is open source has nothing to do with security. [...] having the server code open source adds absolutely nothing to this security model, [...] The security rests only upon the open source client code. The server is completely orthogonal to security. The issue a lot of people have with Signal is that your definition here of where security comes from is an extremely narrow & technical one, and many would rather look at security in a more holistic manner. The problem with messaging security is that there's two ends, and individually we only control one of them. Ok, screenshotting & leaking your messages will always be a concern no matter what technology we develop, but the other challenge is just getting the other end to use Signal in the first place and that's governed by the network effect of competitors. Open Source is essential for security because one of the most fundamental security features we can possibly hope to gain is platform mobility. Signal doesn't offer any. If Signal gains mass adoption and the server changes, we're right back to our current security challenge: getting your contacts onto the new secure thing.
- kreetx 6y ago
  But now the server code is there, so we now have this mobility, no?
  - acrispino 6y ago
    Until they decide to go silent for another 11 months
    - kreetx 6y ago
      Most of the popular chat-app space is not open source. What is it with Signal that people feel entitled to condemn it for not having the latest commits on github?
      - neolog 6y ago
        What is it with chat apps that people don't condemn them for being closed source? Imagine if GCC hid their changes for a year.
gojomo 6y ago
Signal Foundation has legitimate self-serving strategic reasons to prefer such secrecy, sure. But users also have legitimate reasons to want more transparency into both source-code & strategy. Whether such secrecy best serves the users & the cause of private messaging is an open question.
- frombody 6y ago
  Exactly! It isn't about cryptocurrency at all. It's about trust. The relationship between mobilecoin and signal isn't even clear as far as I can tell. You're just asked to look at an obvious cash grab and be willing to accept it as normal operating procedure, and then expected to trust your most private communications to the same individuals that won't reveal their true intentions.
pmlnr 6y ago
> A lot of these comments are just manifestations of the kneejerk HN "crypto bad" reflex. Nope. It's a reaction to "who the f* asked for this in a messaging app?!".
- cptskippy 6y ago
  Unless you have your head thoroughly buried in the sand, you'd understand that all the major players allow people to send money AND people are using those platforms to send money. When people evaluate a new messaging client, the minimum feature set required to be considered viable now includes sending money for a lot of the population. * removed insult
  - pmlnr 6y ago
    > all the major players allow people to send money AND people are using those platforms to send money. So if major players jump off a cliff, everyone should always follow? > the minimum feature set required to be considered viable now includes sending money for a lot of the population. ? No, thank you. Not where the actual banking system is working.
    - cptskippy 6y ago
      Just because you don't like it or don't find it relevant in your local circle doesn't mean it is without value. Last time I traveled to Italy, hailing and paying for taxis was handled exclusively over OTT messaging.
- neolog 6y ago
  Text isn't the only thing I want to be able to send to people. I wish there were a universal "send thing" api that could be implemented for text, images, money, whatever.
  - dunefox 6y ago
    Like Matrix?
codethief 6y ago
> Whether or not Signal's server is open source has nothing to do with security This true only when you are exclusively concerned about your messages' content but not about the metadata. As we all know, though, the metadata is the valuable stuff. There is a second reason it is wrong, though: These days, lots of actual user data (i.e. != metadata) gets uploaded to the Signal servers[0] and encrypted with the user's Signal PIN (modulo some key derivation function). Unfortunately, many users choose an insecure PIN, not a passphrase with lots of entropy, so the derived encryption key isn't particularly strong. (IMO it doesn't help that it's called a PIN. They should rather call it "ultra-secure master passphrase".) This is where a technology called Intel SGX comes into play: It provides remote attestation that the code running on the servers is the real deal, i.e. the trusted and verified code, and not the code with the added backdoor. So yes, the server code does need to be published and verified. Finally, let's not forget the fact that SGX doesn't seem particularly secure, either[1], so it's even more important that the Signal developers be open about the server code. [0]: https://signal.org/blog/secure-value-recovery/ https://signal.org/blog/secure-value-recovery/ [1]: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2020/07/10/a-few-thoughts-about-signals-secure-value-recovery/ https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2020/07/10/a-few-th...
- codethief 6y ago
  Addendum: Out of pure interest I just went into a deep dive into the Signal-Android repository and tried to figure out where exactly the SGX remote attestation happens. I figured that somewhere in the app there should be hash or something of the code running on the servers. Unfortunately, `rg -i SGX` only yielded the following two pieces of code: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/master/libsignal/service/src/main/java/org/whispersystems/signalservice/internal/contacts/crypto/SigningCertificate.java#L72 https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/master/libs... https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/master/libsignal/service/src/main/java/org/whispersystems/signalservice/internal/contacts/crypto/Quote.java#L8 https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/master/libs... No immediate sign of a fixed hash. Instead, it looks like the code only verifies the certificate chain of some signature? How does this help if we want to verify the server is running a specific version of the code and we cannot trust the certificate issuer (whether it's Intel or Signal)? I'm probably (hopefully) wrong here, so maybe someone else who's more familiar with the code could chime in here and explain this to me? :)
iudqnolq 6y ago
Focussing on whether the changes directly make things insecure is missing the point. Fundamentally this sort of security is about trust. While it's nice to try to have Signal be resilient to attacks by the core team, there just aren't enough community-minded independent volunteer code reviewers to reliably catch them up. I doubt the signal foundation gets any significant volunteer efforts, even by programmers who aren't security experts. That means I need to decide if I trust the Signal Foundation. Shilling sketchy cryptocurrencies is indicative of loose morals, which makes me think I was wrong to trust them in the past.
- cptskippy 6y ago
  > Shilling sketchy cryptocurrencies is indicative of loose morals, which makes me think I was wrong to trust them in the past. Who decided it was sketchy? The "I don't like change so I'm going to piss all over you" attitude is what sinks a lot good things. How does Signal benefit from being a shill for this coin? Are they being paid by MOB or do they get a % of the cut? So far all I've read are people screaming their heads off that MOB eats babies and how dare Signal stoop so low as to even fart in their general direction, but I have yet to see anyone explain why MOB is bad or how Signal is bad for giving MOB a platform.
  - bostonsre 6y ago
    Yea, I'm bearish on cryptocurrencies, but I think moxie and his team have built up an incredible amount of goodwill in my book. Enough for me to hear out their solution before making a decision. I'm assuming they didn't write dogecoin2 or even a bitcoin clone. It will be interesting to learn about it.
  - iudqnolq 6y ago
    > How does Signal benefit from being a shill for this coin? Are they being paid by MOB or do they get a % of the cut? The CEO of signal messenger LLC was/is the CTO of MOB. See https://www.reddit.com/r/signal/comments/mm6nad/bought_mobilecoin_you_might_have_been_scammed_375/ https://www.reddit.com/r/signal/comments/mm6nad/bought_mobil... and https://www.wired.com/story/signal-mobilecoin-payments-messaging-cryptocurrency/ https://www.wired.com/story/signal-mobilecoin-payments-messa...
emptysongglass 6y ago
You're apologizing for a project that has repeatedly damaged user trust with excuses. These are "valid" reasons for keeping the source code private for a year? By whose book? Yours? Certainly not by mine. I wouldn't let any other business abscond from its promise to keep open source open source in spirit and practice, why would I let Signal? This is some underhanded, sneaky maneuvering I'm more used to seeing from the Amazons and the Facebooks of the world. These are not the actions of an ethically Good organization. And as has already been demonstrated by Moxie in his lust to power, he's more than capable of deviance. On Wire vs Signal: "He claimed that we had copied his work and demanded that we either recreate it without looking at his code, or take a license from him and add his copyright header to our code. We explained that we have not copied his work. His behavior was concerning and went beyond a reasonable business exchange — he claimed to have recorded a phone call with me without my knowledge or consent, and he threatened to go public with information about alleged vulnerabilities in Wire’s implementation that he refused to identify." [1] These are not the machinations of the crypto-idealist, scrappy underdog for justice we are painted by such publications as the New Yorker. This is some straight up cartoon villain twirling their moustache plotting. So now I'm being sold on a business vision that was just so hot the public's eyes couldn't bear it? We're talking about a pre-mined cryptocurrency that its inventors are laughing themselves to the bank with. At least Pavel Durov of Telegram is honest with his users. At least we have Element doing their work in the open for all to see with the Matrix protocol. There are better, more ethical, less shady organizations out there who we can and ought to be putting our trust in, not this freakshow of a morally-compromised shamble. [1] https://medium.com/@wireapp/axolotl-and-proteus-788519b186a7 https://medium.com/@wireapp/axolotl-and-proteus-788519b186a7
- selykg 6y ago
  Repeatedly? This is the first I'm aware of, what are the others?
- mr_woozy 6y ago
  Thanks for linking this, I had no idea this occurred.
CynicusRex 6y ago
>kneejerk HN "crypto bad" reflex You make it sound as if that's a bad thing. Reflexes are beneficial when the treats are real. And the crypto“currency” multi-level marketing pyramid schemes are very real. They do nothing but induce greed, gambling, spam, and all-around toxic behavior. It's a digital cancer that needs to end.
- z3ncyberpunk 6y ago
  So you want us to stick with the usual paper money, im sorry -- fiat currency, pyramid scheme? no thanks
dang 6y ago
> A lot of these comments are just manifestations of the kneejerk HN "crypto bad" reflex The contrarian dynamic strikes again: https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&sort=byDate&type=comment&query=%22contrarian%20dynamic%22%20objecti%20by:dang https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&sor...
hda2 6y ago
> Whether or not Signal's server is open source has nothing to do with security. Wrong. Availability is a core component of security. Keeping your server implementation closed and only available from one single entity gives signal a failing grade in my book. Signal is great for one-off messaging but is a poor long-term solution for secure instant messaging.

by woah 6y ago

unhammer 6y ago

> The security rests only upon the open source client code. The server is completely orthogonal to security. For Android at least, builds are reproducible https://signal.org/blog/reproducible-android/ https://signal.org/blog/reproducible-android/ (would be neat if there was one or more third party CI's that also checked that the CI-built app reproduces the one on Google Play Store – or maybe there already are?)

cptskippy 6y ago
That's pretty neat, I wasn't aware that was possible.
hnjst 6y ago
While I find laudable this effort and consider it a valid security improvement, the fact that Signal is opposed to alternate clients (and even builds from other sources like FDroid) opens another orthogonal risk. I doubt that many people rebuild the app at each update to check that the new binaries match the ones provided by their store. If, for example, the PlayStore distributed at large a binary that doesn't match the published sources, some dedicated user would probably spot the issue. However, the PlayStore (and Signal, but it's not even necessary for the following) being under US jurisdiction, any user not checking each update it receives is vulnerable to the NSL + gag order famous combo in case of a targeted attack. I recognize that this is probably something that most people do not include in their threat model but I'm still a bit dubious about the fact that convenience related to release management and not having to worry about interoperability is worth accepting the risks linked to a unique delivery channel, especially for what could (and is widely thought to) be a completely secure IM solution. "Almost secure" is frighteningly the worse obstacle to "secure"... I'm admittedly biased since I'm convinced that federation, multiple client/server implementations and multiple distribution channels are a requirement for a secure IM infrastructure (which is why my heart goes to Matrix nowadays).

lucideer 6y ago

> - Whether or not Signal's server is open source has nothing to do with security. [...] having the server code open source adds absolutely nothing to this security model, [...] The security rests only upon the open source client code. The server is completely orthogonal to security. The issue a lot of people have with Signal is that your definition here of where security comes from is an extremely narrow & technical one, and many would rather look at security in a more holistic manner. The problem with messaging security is that there's two ends, and individually we only control one of them. Ok, screenshotting & leaking your messages will always be a concern no matter what technology we develop, but the other challenge is just getting the other end to use Signal in the first place and that's governed by the network effect of competitors. Open Source is essential for security because one of the most fundamental security features we can possibly hope to gain is platform mobility. Signal doesn't offer any. If Signal gains mass adoption and the server changes, we're right back to our current security challenge: getting your contacts onto the new secure thing.

kreetx 6y ago
But now the server code is there, so we now have this mobility, no?
- acrispino 6y ago
  Until they decide to go silent for another 11 months
  - kreetx 6y ago
    Most of the popular chat-app space is not open source. What is it with Signal that people feel entitled to condemn it for not having the latest commits on github?
    - neolog 6y ago
      What is it with chat apps that people don't condemn them for being closed source? Imagine if GCC hid their changes for a year.

gojomo 6y ago

Signal Foundation has legitimate self-serving strategic reasons to prefer such secrecy, sure. But users also have legitimate reasons to want more transparency into both source-code & strategy. Whether such secrecy best serves the users & the cause of private messaging is an open question.

frombody 6y ago
Exactly! It isn't about cryptocurrency at all. It's about trust. The relationship between mobilecoin and signal isn't even clear as far as I can tell. You're just asked to look at an obvious cash grab and be willing to accept it as normal operating procedure, and then expected to trust your most private communications to the same individuals that won't reveal their true intentions.

pmlnr 6y ago

> A lot of these comments are just manifestations of the kneejerk HN "crypto bad" reflex. Nope. It's a reaction to "who the f* asked for this in a messaging app?!".

cptskippy 6y ago
Unless you have your head thoroughly buried in the sand, you'd understand that all the major players allow people to send money AND people are using those platforms to send money. When people evaluate a new messaging client, the minimum feature set required to be considered viable now includes sending money for a lot of the population. * removed insult
- pmlnr 6y ago
  > all the major players allow people to send money AND people are using those platforms to send money. So if major players jump off a cliff, everyone should always follow? > the minimum feature set required to be considered viable now includes sending money for a lot of the population. ? No, thank you. Not where the actual banking system is working.
  - cptskippy 6y ago
    Just because you don't like it or don't find it relevant in your local circle doesn't mean it is without value. Last time I traveled to Italy, hailing and paying for taxis was handled exclusively over OTT messaging.
neolog 6y ago
Text isn't the only thing I want to be able to send to people. I wish there were a universal "send thing" api that could be implemented for text, images, money, whatever.
- dunefox 6y ago
  Like Matrix?

codethief 6y ago

> Whether or not Signal's server is open source has nothing to do with security This true only when you are exclusively concerned about your messages' content but not about the metadata. As we all know, though, the metadata is the valuable stuff. There is a second reason it is wrong, though: These days, lots of actual user data (i.e. != metadata) gets uploaded to the Signal servers[0] and encrypted with the user's Signal PIN (modulo some key derivation function). Unfortunately, many users choose an insecure PIN, not a passphrase with lots of entropy, so the derived encryption key isn't particularly strong. (IMO it doesn't help that it's called a PIN. They should rather call it "ultra-secure master passphrase".) This is where a technology called Intel SGX comes into play: It provides remote attestation that the code running on the servers is the real deal, i.e. the trusted and verified code, and not the code with the added backdoor. So yes, the server code does need to be published and verified. Finally, let's not forget the fact that SGX doesn't seem particularly secure, either[1], so it's even more important that the Signal developers be open about the server code. [0]: https://signal.org/blog/secure-value-recovery/ https://signal.org/blog/secure-value-recovery/ [1]: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2020/07/10/a-few-thoughts-about-signals-secure-value-recovery/ https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2020/07/10/a-few-th...

codethief 6y ago
Addendum: Out of pure interest I just went into a deep dive into the Signal-Android repository and tried to figure out where exactly the SGX remote attestation happens. I figured that somewhere in the app there should be hash or something of the code running on the servers. Unfortunately, `rg -i SGX` only yielded the following two pieces of code: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/master/libsignal/service/src/main/java/org/whispersystems/signalservice/internal/contacts/crypto/SigningCertificate.java#L72 https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/master/libs... https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/master/libsignal/service/src/main/java/org/whispersystems/signalservice/internal/contacts/crypto/Quote.java#L8 https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/master/libs... No immediate sign of a fixed hash. Instead, it looks like the code only verifies the certificate chain of some signature? How does this help if we want to verify the server is running a specific version of the code and we cannot trust the certificate issuer (whether it's Intel or Signal)? I'm probably (hopefully) wrong here, so maybe someone else who's more familiar with the code could chime in here and explain this to me? :)

iudqnolq 6y ago

Focussing on whether the changes directly make things insecure is missing the point. Fundamentally this sort of security is about trust. While it's nice to try to have Signal be resilient to attacks by the core team, there just aren't enough community-minded independent volunteer code reviewers to reliably catch them up. I doubt the signal foundation gets any significant volunteer efforts, even by programmers who aren't security experts. That means I need to decide if I trust the Signal Foundation. Shilling sketchy cryptocurrencies is indicative of loose morals, which makes me think I was wrong to trust them in the past.

cptskippy 6y ago
> Shilling sketchy cryptocurrencies is indicative of loose morals, which makes me think I was wrong to trust them in the past. Who decided it was sketchy? The "I don't like change so I'm going to piss all over you" attitude is what sinks a lot good things. How does Signal benefit from being a shill for this coin? Are they being paid by MOB or do they get a % of the cut? So far all I've read are people screaming their heads off that MOB eats babies and how dare Signal stoop so low as to even fart in their general direction, but I have yet to see anyone explain why MOB is bad or how Signal is bad for giving MOB a platform.
- bostonsre 6y ago
  Yea, I'm bearish on cryptocurrencies, but I think moxie and his team have built up an incredible amount of goodwill in my book. Enough for me to hear out their solution before making a decision. I'm assuming they didn't write dogecoin2 or even a bitcoin clone. It will be interesting to learn about it.
- iudqnolq 6y ago
  > How does Signal benefit from being a shill for this coin? Are they being paid by MOB or do they get a % of the cut? The CEO of signal messenger LLC was/is the CTO of MOB. See https://www.reddit.com/r/signal/comments/mm6nad/bought_mobilecoin_you_might_have_been_scammed_375/ https://www.reddit.com/r/signal/comments/mm6nad/bought_mobil... and https://www.wired.com/story/signal-mobilecoin-payments-messaging-cryptocurrency/ https://www.wired.com/story/signal-mobilecoin-payments-messa...

emptysongglass 6y ago

You're apologizing for a project that has repeatedly damaged user trust with excuses. These are "valid" reasons for keeping the source code private for a year? By whose book? Yours? Certainly not by mine. I wouldn't let any other business abscond from its promise to keep open source open source in spirit and practice, why would I let Signal? This is some underhanded, sneaky maneuvering I'm more used to seeing from the Amazons and the Facebooks of the world. These are not the actions of an ethically Good organization. And as has already been demonstrated by Moxie in his lust to power, he's more than capable of deviance. On Wire vs Signal: "He claimed that we had copied his work and demanded that we either recreate it without looking at his code, or take a license from him and add his copyright header to our code. We explained that we have not copied his work. His behavior was concerning and went beyond a reasonable business exchange — he claimed to have recorded a phone call with me without my knowledge or consent, and he threatened to go public with information about alleged vulnerabilities in Wire’s implementation that he refused to identify." [1] These are not the machinations of the crypto-idealist, scrappy underdog for justice we are painted by such publications as the New Yorker. This is some straight up cartoon villain twirling their moustache plotting. So now I'm being sold on a business vision that was just so hot the public's eyes couldn't bear it? We're talking about a pre-mined cryptocurrency that its inventors are laughing themselves to the bank with. At least Pavel Durov of Telegram is honest with his users. At least we have Element doing their work in the open for all to see with the Matrix protocol. There are better, more ethical, less shady organizations out there who we can and ought to be putting our trust in, not this freakshow of a morally-compromised shamble. [1] https://medium.com/@wireapp/axolotl-and-proteus-788519b186a7 https://medium.com/@wireapp/axolotl-and-proteus-788519b186a7

selykg 6y ago
Repeatedly? This is the first I'm aware of, what are the others?
mr_woozy 6y ago
Thanks for linking this, I had no idea this occurred.

CynicusRex 6y ago

>kneejerk HN "crypto bad" reflex You make it sound as if that's a bad thing. Reflexes are beneficial when the treats are real. And the crypto“currency” multi-level marketing pyramid schemes are very real. They do nothing but induce greed, gambling, spam, and all-around toxic behavior. It's a digital cancer that needs to end.

z3ncyberpunk 6y ago
So you want us to stick with the usual paper money, im sorry -- fiat currency, pyramid scheme? no thanks

dang 6y ago

> A lot of these comments are just manifestations of the kneejerk HN "crypto bad" reflex The contrarian dynamic strikes again: https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&sort=byDate&type=comment&query=%22contrarian%20dynamic%22%20objecti%20by:dang https://hn.algolia.com/?dateRange=all&page=0&prefix=true&sor...

hda2 6y ago

> Whether or not Signal's server is open source has nothing to do with security. Wrong. Availability is a core component of security. Keeping your server implementation closed and only available from one single entity gives signal a failing grade in my book. Signal is great for one-off messaging but is a poor long-term solution for secure instant messaging.